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Abstract
Women in developing countries are disempowered: high youth unemployment, early mar-
riage and childbearing interact to limit their investments into human capital and enforce
dependence on men. We evaluate a multifaceted policy intervention attempting to jump-
start adolescent women’s empowerment in Uganda, a context in which 60% of the popula-
tion are aged below twenty. The intervention aims to relax human capital constraints that
adolescent girls face by simultaneously providing them vocational training and information
on sex, reproduction and marriage. We …nd that four years post-intervention, adolescent
girls in treated communities are 49pp more likely to engage in income generating activities,
corresponding to a 48% increase over baseline levels, and an impact almost entirely driven
by their greater engagement in self-employment. Teen pregnancy falls by a third, and early
entry into marriage/cohabitation also falls rapidly. Strikingly, the share of girls reporting
sex against their will drops by close to a third and aspired ages at which to marry and start
childbearing move forward. The results highlight the potential of a multifaceted program
that provides skills transfers as a viable and cost e¤ective policy intervention to improve the
economic and social empowerment of adolescent girls over a four year horizon.
JEL Classi…cations: I25, J13, J24.
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1 Introduction
Women’s empowerment has three key dimensions: political, economic, and control over one’s
body. In today’s developed countries, the historic process of economic empowerment, and to a
lesser extent, control over the body, mostly preceded universal su¤rage [Fernandez 2014]. This
is almost entirely reversed in many developing countries today: universal su¤rage for women was
often achieved at independence, yet empowerment along economic and reproductive dimensions has
progressed more slowly andmight be reversing in some countries [Doepke et al. 2012, Jayachandran
2015].
In these countries, female labor force earnings are strikingly low and the majority of women
marry and have children at far younger ages relative to their contemporaries in developed nations
[World Bank 2007, Doepke et al. 2012, Jayachandran 2015]. The type of technological advances
that drove demand for female labor in the developed nations have spread less far in the developing
world [Goldin 2006, Goldin and Katz 2008], access to contraceptive methods, which enable control
over reproduction and facilitate human capital investment, is more limited [Goldin and Katz 2002]
and violence towards women is more prevalent and acceptable [Anderson and Ray 2010, Doepke et
al. 2012, Jayachandran 2015]. Many women in these countries appear trapped in an equilibrium
where the phenomena of low human capital investment, restricted access to labor markets (relative
to men) and limited control over their bodies reinforce each other, leading to dependence on men.
The key question is then whether jump-starting women’s human capital accumulation can
empower them and set them on a trajectory towards a better equilibrium, or whether such cir-
cumstances are maintained by binding norms or low aspirations, that cannot easily be shifted or
relaxed by public policy [Field et al. 2010]. This is the research question at the heart of our
analysis. We evaluate a multifaceted program that provides adolescent girls with an opportunity
to simultaneously accumulate two types of human capital: vocational skills to enable them to start
small-scale income generating activities, and life skills to help to make informed choices about sex,
reproduction and marriage.
Targeting adolescents is important. As dependence on parents comes to a close during ado-
lescence, there is a central tension between whether women are able to delay childbearing and
undertake human capital investments critical to pursuing some form of career, or become depen-
dent on men (either as a wife or via temporary relationships). A lack of future skilled labor market
opportunities can reduce the incentives for young girls to invest in their human capital [Jensen
2012], leading to early marriage and childbearing, and potentially increasing their dependency on
older men [Dupas 2011]. In turn, teen pregnancy and early marriage are likely to have a decisive
impact on the ability of young girls to accumulate human capital, and limit their future participa-
tion in skilled jobs [Field and Ambrus 2008, Bruce and Hallman 2008].1 Economic empowerment
1Baird et al. [2011] document that marriage and schooling are mutually exclusive activities in Malawi, and Ozier
[2016] provides similar evidence from Kenya. In Bangladesh, Field and Ambrus [2008] show that each additional
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and social empowerment, in its most basic form as having control over the body, thus interact in
a powerful way during adolescence. Hence interventions targeted towards adolescent girls might
have higher returns than later timed interventions [Heckman and Mosso 2014]. Moreover, multi-
faceted interventions such as the one we study, recognize the multidimensional nature of womens’
empowerment, and hence might be more e¤ective and self-reinforcing than interventions focused
on just one aspect of disempowerment.
Helping young women out of this low-empowerment equilibrium has become a priority for
policy makers in developing countries because of burgeoning youth populations and concerns over
youth unemployment.2 This is true throughout Sub-Saharan Africa and especially in Uganda, the
focus of this study. Uganda has among the lowest median age of countries and among the highest
child dependency ratio as shown in Figure 1A [UNAIDS 2010]. For those in the labor force, women
tend to have higher unemployment rates relative to men, and this is especially pronounced in the
youngest age cohorts. Finally, as Figure 1B highlights, relative to their contemporaries in richer
economies, the fertility rate of Ugandan women is three to four times higher and the gap is most
pronounced among adolescents aged 15 to 19.3
Against this background, the multifaceted program we evaluate aims to break the vicious
cycle between low participation in skilled jobs and high fertility by kick-starting human capital
accumulation along two dimensions through the simultaneous provision of: (i) ‘hard’ vocational
skills to enable adolescent girls to start small-scale income generating activities; (ii) ‘soft’ life
skills to build knowledge enabling girls to make informed choices about sex, reproduction and
marriage. The program thus recognizes the external constraints girls face, such as a lack of
labor market relevant skills. The program also recognizes internal constraints girls face, and the
life skills component aims to empower them through raising their knowledge, self-con…dence and
aspirations.4 The intervention is delivered from designated ‘adolescent development clubs’ rather
than in schools, and can thus reach school drop-outs as well as girls currently enrolled in school.
year that marriage is delayed is associated with 3 additional years of schooling and 65% higher literacy rates.
2The number of young people in the developing world is increasing: one billion people on the planet are aged
between 15 and 24 and reside in a developing country, an increase of 17% since 1995. Nowhere is this phenomenon
more pronounced than in Sub-Saharan Africa, where 60% of the population is now aged below twenty [World
Bank 2009]. The continued rise in the numbers of young people in the global population has led policy makers
to consider responses to what has now become termed the ‘youth bulge’ [World Bank 2007]. The central policy
challenge is to provide increasing numbers of young people the skills and job opportunities to enable them to lead
ful…lled and economically self-reliant lives in adulthood. A parallel set of concerns are that ever rising numbers
and proportions of youth will be a key factor driving alienation, social unrest and demands for political reforms,
as has been observed throughout North Africa and the Middle East recently [Fuller 1995, Goldstone 2002].
3Demographic and Health Survey data indicates 38% of the 52 million women aged 20-24 in developing countries
were married before age 18 [Mensch et al. 2005] and these girls are often subject to unprotected sex. Girls aged
15-24 are almost 8 times more likely than men to be HIV positive in Sub-Saharan Africa [Bruce and Hallman 2008,
UNAIDS 2010, Dupas 2011]. Unprotected heterosexual intercourse together with the onward transmission of HIV
to newborn and breast-fed babies is responsible for the vast majority of new HIV infections in the region.
4Lybbert and Wydick [2017] provide an overview of the psychology of hope and aspirations. The notion of such
internal constraints has gradually begun to inform debates in economics on poverty and economic development
[Ray 2006, Genicot and Ray 2017].
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Moreover, these clubs can serve as a safe-space for girls to meet and socialize with other adolescent
girls, free from pressures exerted by adolescent and older men.
The program was developed in another country, Bangladesh, where female disempowerment
is also a major issue. Since 1993 in Bangladesh, BRAC, one of the world’s largest NGOs, has
established 9 000 clubs that have reached over one million adolescent girls. We worked with
BRAC to evaluate the program in an African setting where women face similar challenges to those
in Bangladesh. The program has proved to be transportable across countries, and also scalable
and cost e¤ective: to date BRAC has started 1200 clubs in Uganda, reaching 50 000 girls.5
We collaborated with BRAC to randomly assign clubs across communities. We surveyed and
tracked a representative sample of almost 5 000 adolescent girls at baseline, midline (two-years
post intervention) and endline (four years post-intervention), allowing us to chart the longer term
dynamic impacts on empowerment of the program. Club participation is voluntary and unrelated
to other BRAC activities.
At baseline, we document the low levels of empowerment adolescent girls have across all spheres
of life. In terms of economic independence, few girls (6%) report being self-employed, and rates of
wage employment are even lower. Given that around 30% of the girls are not in school, this suggests
most girls that have left the formal education system are not successfully transitioning into work,
and remain unemployed, underemployed or reliant on casual work. Indeed, 60% of girls worry
they will not …nd a job in adulthood. On dimensions of empowerment related to control over the
body, 17% report having had sex unwillingly in the past year. Girls also display limited knowledge
related to pregnancy and HIV, only half report always using a condom if they are sexually active.
On aspirations, on an overall index of gender empowerment based on multiple questions relating
to gender roles in labor markets, education and household chores, we …nd that girls themselves
strongly hold views that assign gender-roles in the main spheres of life. Adolescent girls believe
that women should get married at around 24 years of age: clearly observed behavior departs
signi…cantly from these expressed ideals, suggesting the presence of other binding constraints.
Despite these low levels of empowerment at baseline, the take-up rate for the ELA program is
21%, suggesting that a sizeable share of eligible girls have latent demand for the skills on o¤er, and
are not held back from participating by social norms or their own weak aspirations over women’s
labor force participation, teen childbearing and marriage.
Our results show that four years post-intervention, the bundled provision of hard vocational
and soft life skills through the program leads to substantial advances in economic empowerment
and control over the body for adolescent girls in treated communities relative to girls in control
communities. ITT estimates imply girls in treated communities are 49 percentage point (pp)
more likely to engage in income generating activities relative to girls in control communities,
corresponding to a 48% increase over baseline levels, that is driven predominantly by additional
5The program has also started in Tanzania, where 200 clubs have over 7 000 adolescents enrolled in them, 120
clubs have been set up in South Sudan. Ongoing pilots are taking place in Afghanistan and Liberia.
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engagement in self-employment activities: at midline, rates of self-employment are near double
those in control communities at baseline (122pp versus 63pp), and at endline these rates remain
50% higher (at 95pp) relative to girls in control communities.
Despite school-enrolled girls being eligible for the program, we …nd no reduction in school
enrollment among eligibles (at either midline or endline). Hence, gains in economic empowerment
from the program do not come at the cost of girl’s lowering their investment in formal education.
The program signi…cantly improves control over the body: by endline the probability of having
a child is 38pp lower in treated communities, corresponding to 34% of the baseline mean rate of
early (teen) pregnancy. The endline ITT estimate shows girls in treated communities to be 8pp
less likely to be married/cohabiting, corresponding to 62% of the baseline mean. This divergence
in trends continues to endline, at which point they are 8pp less likely to be married or cohabiting.
Most dramatically, the share of adolescent girls reporting having had sex unwillingly in the past
year is 53pp lower in treatment vs. control communities by endline, starting from a baseline level
of 17%. This is perhaps the clearest marker that the bundled provision of life skills and vocational
training successfully improves the adolescent girls’ relationship quality.
Finally, we evaluate changes in girls’ expectations for ages at marriage, childbearing and fer-
tility, as well as aspirations for their own daughters (and sons). The overall picture from these
aspirations related outcomes are that although the program impacts most dimensions in the short
term, these tend to die out by endline. There are however two notable dimensions of aspirations
that do not die out, and relate closely to the earlier documented impacts: these relate to adolescent
girl’s views on ideal ages at marriage for women, and the most suitable age to start childbearing.
On both dimensions, these shifts in aspirations endure and we record impacts that are statistically
signi…cant at endline.
We then investigate three further issues that are crucial for understanding the wider impacts
and scalability of ELA as a tool to aid womens’ empowerment: spillovers to non-participants,
unbundling its components, and its cost e¤ectiveness.
On spillovers, the ITT e¤ect size impacts along all three dimensions of female empowerment
are economically as well as statistically signi…cant. At the same time, ELA participation rates are
just over 20%. The …ndings beg the question of whether the documented impacts arise from ELA
participants alone, or whether they suggest spillovers onto non-participating adolescent girls in the
same treated communities. We examine the issue in more detail using two strategies. First, we
describe the potential nature of spillovers through a non-experimental comparison of di¤erences in
outcomes between non-participants in treatment and control communities. This hints at spillovers
existing, and being greater in magnitude for dimensions of empowerment captured in aspirations
and control over the body indices, and weaker for forms of economic empowerment. This pattern
makes sense as what girls learn from the life skills training may be easier to transmit to other girls
relative to what they learn from vocational skills training.
Second, we extend our research design to estimate marginal treatment e¤ects (MTEs). This
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sheds light on whether there are homogenous or heterogenous returns to ELA participation, the
nature of self-selection into participation (the girls driving spillovers), and allows us to construct
other relevant treatment e¤ects from which to assess the strength of any spillover e¤ects. The
estimated MTEs rule out homogenous gains to ELA: while the evidence suggests no girls lose
from ELA, the potential gains from participation vary enormously across girls, and dimensions of
empowerment. The MTEs also reveal the pattern of selection into participation varies across the
di¤erent dimensions of empowerment.
A central advantage of the ELA approach is its potential to give a big push to adolescent
girls’ empowerment along potentially interlinked dimensions and thus kickstart a virtuous cycle of
gains. The downside is that it becomes harder to disentangle if one program component is more
e¤ective in raising empowerment than others. To shed light on the role of program components,
we probe the data using mediation analysis, following Gelbach [2016] in decomposing the overall
ITT impacts on indices of empowerment related to economic outcomes, control over the body
and aspirations, into components explained by potential mediators. This exercise highlights the
important role life skills training provides for all dimensions of empowerment, but also suggests
the provision of a safe space for girls, or enabling them access to older female mentors, might also
be key. Such issues should obviously be factored into future evaluations and scale-ups.
Finally, we …nd the program to be highly cost e¤ective over the four year evaluation horizon.
The overall cost per eligible adolescent girl is $179. To put this in context, this corresponds to
less than 1% of household annual incomes at baseline. If the per girl bene…ts to adolescent girls in
communities o¤ered the ELA program are larger than this, the program is sustainable from the
social planner’s perspective. If the program has some components that are more e¤ective than
others, this cost can be brought down further in future scale-ups.
Our core contribution to the literature is to provide novel evidence on how to empower young
women in low-income contexts. To do this we both carefully measure all key dimensions of adoles-
cent empowerment at baseline and examine how these are a¤ected by the intervention at midline
and endline. There is a long established literature from across the social sciences discussing the is-
sue using observational data [Goldin and Katz 2002, Doepke et al. 2012, Du‡o 2012, Jayachandran
2015], and a more nascent experimental literature seeking to evaluate school-based interventions
often focused on one aspect of disempowerment, and over somewhat shorter horizons [Ashraf et al.
2017, Dhar et al. 2018].6 A strength of the ELA approach is to try and tackle multiple, interlinked,
6Two recent evaluations of interventions speci…cally designed to empower young women are Ashraf et al. [2017]
and Dhar et al. [2018]. Both evaluate schools-based interventions, with a focus on improving the negotation skills
of girls or to reshape their attitudes towards gender, respectively. Ashraf et al. [2017] evaluate the e¤ects of
interventions targeting adolescent girls enrolled in primary schools in Zambia, providing them with negotiation-
skills training, and a safe-space in which to congregate. They …nd the negotiation skills training led to long-run
improvements in human capital outcomes of treated girls, but the safe space program had no signi…cant e¤ect.
Neither intervention had an e¤ect on pregnancy rates. They do not report e¤ects on girls’ labor market outcomes.
Dhar et al. [2018] evaluate a school-based intervention for adolescents in Haryana, India, designed to reshape their
gender attitudes. The intervention involved a series of 45 minute sessions where children discussed gender equality
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constraints simultaneously. The intervention also targets adolescents in a critical stage of the life
cycle as they transit from school to work [Heckman and Mosso 2014].
Our work thus complements a sequence of recent papers examining the impacts of various forms
of soft-skill training for women’s outcomes, although our intervention extends beyond skills deemed
relevant for labor market outcomes, and measures impacts up to four year post-intervention [Groh
et al. 2016, Adhvaryu et al. 2017].7 Our intervention also builds on existing work examining the
impacts of standalone vocational skills training programs, for which meta-analyses have pointed
to low or short-lived returns in low-income settings [Card et al. 2010, Blattman and Ralston 2015,
McKenzie 2017]. Similarly, standalone school-based sex education programs have met with, at
best, rather mixed success [Gallant and Maticka-Tyndale 2004, Paul-Ebhohimhen et al. 2008,
Cornish and Campbell 2009, McCoy et al. 2010, Groh et al. 2012, De Walque 2014]. As in our
setting, some of the more promising life skills interventions have been those delivered outside of
school environments [Dupas 2011].
Our …ndings complement a small body of research using large-scale randomized control tri-
als to provide evidence on the interlinkages between economic and reproductive challenges that
adolescent girls face in developing countries. The main body of evidence built up along these
lines relates to the impacts of (un)conditional cash transfers on risky behaviors, where condition-
ality often relates to school attendance. For example, Baird et al. [2011] …nd a conditional cash
transfer of $10 per month conditional on school attendance for adolescent girls in Malawi led to
signi…cant declines in early marriage, teenage pregnancy and self-reported sexual activity after
a year, while an unconditional cash transfer had generally weaker impacts. Baird et al. [2014]
report bene…cial impacts on the economic and social empowerment of adolescent girls in Malawi
that have dropped out of formal schooling from a cash transfer conditioned on school attendance.
This branch of work sheds light on the direct e¤ect of resources, rather than skills, on economic
and social empowerment. Relative to this earlier literature, our results highlight the potential
of a multifaceted program that provides bundled hard and soft skills as a viable and cost e¤ec-
tive alternative to direct (un)conditional cash transfers, in promoting the economic and social
empowerment of adolescent girls over a four year horizon.8
(and were prompted to think about their own views and societal norms on the matter). They …nd the intervention
has a powerful impact in reshaping gender attitudes among their sample of both boys and girls.
7Groh et al. [2016] evaluate a soft skills training program targeting young women in Jordan, covering skills
orientated towards improving labor market outcomes (e.g. business writing skills, time management, interviewing
skills). Impacts were measured up to 27 months after the program. While the program made participants more
optimistic, it did not have any signi…cant e¤ects on women’s employment outcomes. Adhvaryu et al. [2017]
evaluate a workplace-based soft skills training program on female garment workers’ productivity in India which
focused on communication, problem-solving, decision-making and …nancial literacy skills. Impacts were measured
up to 8 months after the program’s completion. The results indicate training improved women’s soft skills, and
increased their likelihood to request and complete technical skill development trainings. Treated workers were more
productive. There were also signi…cant spillover e¤ects, as non-treated workers in treated production lines were
also more productive and assigned to complex tasks.
8Baird et al. [2014] provide a systematic review of the e¤ects of cash transfer programmes on schooling out-
comes, using data covering 35 studies. They …nd that both conditional cash transfers (CCTs) and unconditional
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Closer to our evaluation in terms of other multifaceted interventions targeting adolescents are
programs evaluated by Du‡o et al. [2015], Acevedo et al. [2017] and Buchmann et al. [2017].
These all add to a growing body of work highlighting the e¢cacy of multifaceted, scalable and
cost e¤ective development interventions.9
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 details the intervention and its implementation.
Section 3 describes the research design, data and estimation strategy. Section 4 presents estimates
of the program’s two- and four-year impacts on adolescent girls’ economic empowerment, control
over the body, expectations and aspirations. Section 5 discusses spillovers, unbundling the compo-
nents of ELA, and cost e¤ectiveness. Section 6 concludes by highlighting the broader implications
of our …ndings for policies and future research designed to address the economic and reproductive
challenges facing the burgeoning number of young women in the developing world today.
2 The Design of the ELA Program
The Empowerment and Livelihood for Adolescents (ELA) program is designed to improve the
lives of adolescent girls along multiple dimensions. It does so through an intervention that simul-
taneously o¤ers girls vocational skills, life skills, as well as a safe space to meet and socialize with
other adolescent girls. The program is implemented by the NGO BRAC Uganda.10
Rather than being a school-based intervention, the ELA program operates through develop-
ment clubs that are in a …xed meeting place in communities. Clubs are open …ve afternoons per
cash transfers (UCTs) improve the odds of being enrolled in and attending school compared to no cash transfer
programme. The e¤ect sizes for enrolment and attendance are always larger for CCTs compared to UCTs, but the
di¤erence is not statistically signi…cant.
9Du‡o et al. [2015] investigate a school-based HIV prevention program in Kenya coupled with subsidies to
attend school, and present evidence highlighting the joint determination of schooling and pregnancy outcomes for
adolescent girls. They show the e¢cacy of providing adolescent girls information on how to reduce their exposure
to pregnancy risks, is larger when reinforced by program components that simultaneously empower girls to lead
economically independent lives. Acevedo et al. [2017] evaluate a soft skills and internship program in the Dominican
Republic, covering skills focused on promoting self-esteem and self-realization, communication, life planning, health
and risky behaviors. The program was evaluated on its own and combined with a vocational training program.
The target population were disadvantaged young men and women (aged 16 to 29). They study impacts up to 36
months post intervention. For women, they …nd that both curricula have strong positive e¤ects on soft skills and
on expectations of future labor market and life success. Both curricula were associated with higher employment
rates in higher paying jobs with higher job satisfaction 12 months after program completion. Buchmann et al.
[2017] evaluate another adolescent girls’ empowerment program in Bangladesh. The content of is quite similar
to the ELA program in Uganda (establishing safe spaces for girls and providing life skills via peer mentoring),
but without the vocational training component. The researchers cross-randomized the intervention with incentives
to delay marriage (an in-kind transfer, conditional on remaining unmarried until the age of 18). They …nd the
empowerment program on its own had no signi…cant e¤ect on child marriage or teenage childbearing but was
e¤ective in increasing schooling. In contrast, the conditional incentive was e¤ective in reducing child marriage and
teenage childbearing.
10In an altogether di¤erent context of raising rural assetless households out of poverty, the ultra-poor graduation
program is another example of a multifaceted (and scalable) intervention (also pioneered by BRAC) that has been
shown in multiple settings, to permanently have an impact on the economic and social lives of bene…ciaries [Banerjee
et al. 2015, Bandiera et al. 2017].
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week and timed so that girls enrolled in school can attend. Club activities are led by a female
mentor. Mentors are selected from within the community and are slightly older than eligible
girls. Mentors receive small lump-sum payments for their work, and they are trained during a
week-long initiation program, as well as monthly refresher courses. Using locally hired mentors
ensures the program is scalable (as evidenced by its spread across countries and continents, and
also its rapid expansion within Uganda). Moreover, the fact that mentors are close in age to
mentees and have often successfully confronted challenges related to economic and social empow-
erment, is thought to help facilitate the transfer of knowledge [Ray 2006]. Indeed, existing work
emphasizes that school-based interventions designed to socially empower adolescent girls may have
limited impact because youth are uncomfortable discussing such matters with teachers [Gallant
and Maticka-Tyndale 2004, Ross et al. 2006].
Club participation is voluntary and unrelated to participation in other BRAC activities.11
Eligibility is based on gender and age: girls aged between 14 and 20 are permitted to participate.
Given the practical di¢culty of verifying age, and the demand for vocational and life skills from
other girls, in practice some girls outside of this age range also attend the clubs and receive skills
training. ELA clubs also host popular recreational activities such as reading, staging plays, singing,
dancing and playing games. As such, outside of school hours, the clubs serve as a protected local
space in which adolescent girls can meet, socialize, privately discuss issues of concern and continue
to develop their skills, at a time of day that is after-school but in the afternoon when their parents
might not be back from work.
The vocational skills and life skills training are provided in the …rst two years of the interven-
tion. After this adolescent girls are free to continue to use the clubs as a safe social space, but do
not receive further training.
Vocational skills training comprises a series of courses on income generating activities includ-
ing hair-dressing, tailoring, computing, agriculture, poultry rearing and small trades operation.
Although many of the skills are applicable for either wage or self-employment, more focus is placed
on the adolescent girls establishing small-scale enterprises of their own. The vocational training
modules are taught by entrepreneurs engaged in the respective activities or by hired professionals
as well as BRAC’s own agriculture and livestock program sta¤. These courses are supplemented by
…nancial literacy courses covering budgeting, …nancial services and accounting skills. The process
of matching girls to income generating activities is partly demand-driven, but also takes account
of the girl’s education, the local business environment and demand for such services (this ensures
not all girls in a community are provided the same vocational skill). The overarching aim of the
vocational skills component of the program is to aid the economic empowerment of adolescent girls
by giving them human capital, thus improving their labor market trajectories and fostering their
11There is little incentive for adolescent girls to join ELA in order to participate in BRAC’s main activity of
micro…nance. Indeed, we see very low take-up of micro…nance among age-eligible girls even when it is o¤ered as
part of the ELA intervention in later years.
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…nancial independence as they make the critical transition from adolescence into adulthood.12
The key topics covered in the life skills training sessions include sexual and reproductive health,
menstruation and menstrual disorders, pregnancy, sexually transmitted infections, HIV/AIDS
awareness, family planning, rape; other sessions cover enabling topics such as management skills,
negotiation, con‡ict resolution and leadership; a …nal class of life skills training focuses on providing
girls with legal knowledge on women’s issues such as bride price, child marriage and violence
against women. These life skills training sessions are conducted either by the trained mentors
and/or BRAC’s own professional sta¤. The overarching aim of the life skills component of the
program is to socially empower girls by enhancing the control that adolescent girls have over their
own bodies, and to enable them to act on improved knowledge of reproductive health.
By aiming to give girls more bargaining power in their relations with men, this aspect of
the intervention can potentially slow down rates of teen pregnancy and marriage. As such, this
program component can be highly complementary to the provision of vocational skills that aims
to have more direct impacts on girls economic empowerment.
Given the age range of targeted girls - some are enrolled in school, others have graduated, while
others have dropped out - clubs operate outside of school times and emphasis is placed on ensuring
that girls enrolled in school do not reduce their educational investments in order to engage in club
activities. We later provide evidence the program had no adverse impact on girls’ investments in
their human capital through the formal education system.
3 Design, Data and Estimation
3.1 Research Design
We evaluate the ELA program using a randomized control trial. BRAC has established branch
o¢ces throughout Uganda, ten of which were chosen for the evaluation. Five branches are located
in rural regions of Iganga and Jinja; the others are in urban or semi-urban regions of Kampala
and Mukono. For expositional ease we refer to communities as the unit of randomization. In rural
areas these correspond to villages. In urban/semi-urban areas, communities correspond to small
neighborhoods. BRAC program o¢cers determined the natural boundaries of a neighborhood. In
each branch, …fteen communities with the potential to host an ELA club were identi…ed. From
this list, ten communities in each branch o¢ce were randomly assigned to receive the treatment,
12The vocational skills provided overlap those studied in the literature on stand-alone business skills training
[Field et al. 2010, Karlan and Valdivia 2011, Drexler et al. 2014]. However, there are some key di¤erences between
this intervention and the kind of business training/entrepreneurship skills program, reviewed by McKenzie and
Woodru¤ [2013], and that have been found to have relatively weak impacts even among those self-selected into
micro-entrepreneurship: (i) it targets adolescent girls, the majority of whom do not engage in self-employment
activities at baseline; (ii) it has an intense training period lasting for two years rather than a few weeks; (iii) the
training covers general business skills as well as technical knowledge and sector speci…c content; (iv) it bundles
vocational skills with life skills and the provision of a safe space for girls to meet.
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i.e. to set up a club and deliver the ELA program, with the remaining …ve communities assigned as
controls. In each treated community, a single club was opened. The research design thus delivers
100 treatment and 50 control communities, strati…ed by branch o¢ce.
We present two- and four-year impacts of the program on the economic and social lives of girls,
just as they transition from adolescence to adulthood. The vocational and life skills training are
provided in the …rst two years of the intervention. When the evaluation was originally designed,
the intention was that after two-years, half of the 100 treated communities would be randomly
assigned to additionally o¤er micro…nance to participating older adolescents in order to capitalize
on their newly acquired skills. During the …rst two years post-intervention, BRAC sta¤, mentors
and adolescent club participants were unaware of the potential future o¤er of micro…nance. In
practice what occurred was that two-years post-intervention, a very limited o¤er of micro…nance
was actually made to age-eligible girls in treated communities: the terms of micro…nance on o¤er
did not di¤er from other pre-existing sources available to girls, and so unsurprisingly, we …nd near
zero take-up of micro…nance. Hence when examining four-year impacts we continue to compare
outcomes between the original set of treated communities (with and without micro…nance) to
control communities. We later provide evidence con…rming the future o¤er of micro…nance does
not drive any of the two-year …ndings.
3.2 Data, Attrition and Descriptives
3.2.1 Surveys
A census of adolescent girls in the 150 evaluation communities was conducted in early 2008. There
are around 130 eligible adolescent girls resident in the average community. We use this census to
draw a random sample of around 40 girls to survey in each. The baseline survey was adminis-
tered to adolescent girls from March to June 2008. ELA clubs were established between June and
September 2008, midline surveys were …elded from March to June 2010, and endline surveys were
…elded May to July 2012. Each survey was conducted face-to-face and was designed to capture
multiple dimensions of empowerment and covers topics related to: (i) the vocational skills compo-
nent, such as …nancial literacy, analytical ability, labor market and income generating activities;
(ii) the life skills component, such as engagement in sex, childbearing and marriage/cohabitation,
HIV related knowledge; (iii) other margins such as educational investments, time use, expendi-
tures, and further measures of economic and social empowerment. At baseline 5 966 adolescent
girls were surveyed: 3 964 (2 002) from treatment (control) communities.13
Panel A of Table 1 shows basic characteristics of adolescents girls at baseline. Girls in our
study are on average aged 16, just over 70% are enrolled in school full-time, and despite their
13We focused all our survey attention on interviewing girls given BRAC’s focus on female outcomes in general,
and because only girls could have been potential bene…ciaries of ELA. We later discuss results from a follow-on
experiment that sheds light on some potential spillovers to boys in the same communities.
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young age, 10% already have at least one child and 10% are already married or in a cohabiting
relationship. The baseline sample is well balanced on these characteristics.
3.2.2 Adolescent Girls’ Empowerment at Baseline
The remaining panels of Table 1 show a range of outcomes related to how empowered adolescent
girls are in their lives pre-intervention, along the three dimensions the ELA program addresses.
Panel B focuses on economic empowerment. We …rst consider girls’ self-assessment of their en-
trepreneurial ability: this is based on an index scaled to run from 0 to 100, constructed from 10
underlying questions.14 The average score is 70, suggesting most girls are con…dent about having
the necessary business-related skills pre-intervention. Despite this con…dence, only 6% of girls
report being self-employed in control communities (the type of income generating activity the pro-
gram fosters by o¤ering vocational skills), and rates of wage employment are even lower. Given
that around 30% of the girls are not in school, these low levels of labor market activity suggest
most girls that have left the formal education system are not successfully transitioning into work,
and remain unemployed, underemployed or reliant on casual work. Indeed, the next row shows
that 60% of girls worry they will not …nd a job in adulthood.15
Panel C relates to the dimensions of empowerment related to control over the body. The data
illustrates the high incidence of girls having sex against their will: in control communities 14%
report having had sex unwillingly in the past year. This signals a striking lack of control that
adolescent girls have over their bodies, a fact typically associated with early childbearing and
marriage. On knowledge related to control over the body, one in four girls incorrectly answer a
very basic question related to pregnancy knowledge, that asks whether “A woman cannot become
pregnant at …rst intercourse or with occasional sexual relations”. Girls score around 38 on a 0-6
scale of HIV knowledge on average, yet there is considerable variation in this metric: at the tails
of the knowledge distribution, 5% of girls correctly answer all the questions and 2% provide no
correct answers. Only 52% of adolescent girls report always using a condom if they are sexually
active and only 17% report using some other form of contraceptive. These self-reports help explain
why teen pregnancy is relatively common for adolescent girls in this context.16
14The entrepreneurial index consists of cumulative ranks (scaled from one to ten with ten being the highest)
of the following activities: “Run your own business”, “Identify business opportunities to start up new business”,
“Obtain credit to start up new business or expand existing business”, “Save in order to invest in future business op-
portunities”, “Make sure that your employees get the work done properly”, “Manage …nancial accounts”, “Bargain
to obtain cheap prices when you are buying anything for business (inputs)”, “Bargain to obtain high prices when
you are selling anything for business (outputs)”, “Protect your business assets from harm by others”, “Collecting
the money someone owes you”.
15The rates of self-employment reported match closely with those from the nationally representative Uganda
National Household Survey 2005/2006. There we …nd that among those in the labor force, self-employment rates
for 12-20 years olds are 7%.
16The HIV knowledge index is based on the number of statements correctly identi…ed as true or false. The
statements are: (i) “A person who has HIV is di¤erent from a person who is ill with AIDS”; (ii) “During vaginal
sex, it is easier for a woman to receive the HIV virus than for a man”; (iii) “Pulling out the penis before a man
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Panel D examines the beliefs and aspirations of girls. We …rst present an overall index of
‘gender empowerment’, scaled from 0 to 100 and based on multiple questions relating to gender
roles in labor markets, education and household chores. A higher index value corresponds to girls
believing that tasks should be gender neutral.17 In control communities, the index average is just
31 (out of 100), suggesting that pre-intervention, adolescent girls themselves hold views that assign
strong gender-roles in the main spheres of life. The …nal row reveals that adolescent girls believe
that women should get married at around 24 years of age: clearly observed behavior departs
signi…cantly from these expressed ideals, suggesting the presence of other binding constraints.
On the majority of the empowerment dimensions the sample is balanced at baseline. Table A1
presents a complete set of balance checks, and shows girls in treatment and control communities
are balanced on observables. The null of equal means is rejected for only two out of the twenty-
one outcomes considered. In all cases the normalized di¤erences are small relative to the sample
variation, and below the rule of thumb value of 25 [Imbens and Wooldridge 2009].
To provide a holistic view of girls’ empowerment and not rely on any one measure, we con-
struct three indices, related to economic empowerment, control over the body and aspirations.
Each index aggregates information over a range of relevant outcomes, where we …rst convert each
subcomponent into a z-score, average across subcomponents and then re-construct a z-score of the
average. For missing values, we impute the mean of the z-score (by survey wave and treatment
status) before computing the overall index. This procedure avoids a focus on a narrow set of
outcomes, and the impacts of the ELA program on these three indices is the core focus of our
empirical analysis.
The economic empowerment index has subcomponents based on a girl’s entrepreneurial ability
score, whether she engages in any IGA, whether she is self-employed, wage employed, and her
monthly expenditures on goods. The control over the body index has subcomponents using in-
formation on whether the adolescent has children, is married/cohabiting, had sex unwillingly in
the last year, her pregnancy knowledge, her HIV knowledge, and if sexually active, whether she
always uses condoms or other contraceptives. The aspirations index has subcomponents related
to the gender empowerment index, what she views as a suitable age at marriage for a woman,
her suitable age at marriage for a man, her preferred number of children, what she views as the
suitable age for a woman to have her …rst child, the preferred age at which her daughters should
climaxes keeps a women from getting HIV during sex”; (iv) “A woman cannot get HIV if she has sex during her
period”; (v) “Taking a test for HIV one week after having sex will tell a person if she or he has HIV”; (vi) “A
Pregnant woman with HIV can give the virus to her unborn baby”.
17The empowerment index is a variable that cumulates the number of times a respondent answers “Both/Same”
to the following questions: “Who should earn money for the family?”, “Who should have a higher level of education
in the family?”, “Who should be responsible for washing, cleaning and cooking?”, “If there is no water pump or
tap, who should fetch water?”, “Who should be responsible for feeding and bathing children?”, “Who should help
the children in their studies at home?” and “Who should be responsible for looking after the ill persons?” The
other possible answers given to the respondent were “Male” and “Female”. The index is then re-scaled such that
100 indicates that the respondent answered that both sexes should be responsible for the mentioned activities.
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marry, and her preferred age for her sons to marry .
Figure 2 shows the resulting distributions of the three indices of empowerment for adolescent
girls at baseline. By construction, each is centred at zero. The indices of economic empowerment
and control over the body are somewhat skewed, suggesting a concentration of highly economically
empowered girls, and a long left tail of girls lacking control over their body. In the cross section
of girls at baseline, the pairwise correlations of these empowerment dimensions are low, although
this need not re‡ect causal interlinkages. This highlights how important it can be to try and shift
empowerment on multiple dimensions simultaneously. Further assessing the correlation in these
indices with household wealth (using a measure based on household assets), we …nd the correlation
with each empowerment index to be less than 05. Hence participation into ELA might not be
simply predicted by family background (as con…rmed later, there is no striking evidence of selection
on observables into participation).
3.2.3 Attrition
Adolescent girls are geographically mobile in Uganda, often relocating to …nd work opportunities
or due to marriage. To maintain high tracking rates over our four-year study period, we collected
multiple contact numbers and details of any contact person(s) mentioned, that could inform us of
the girl’s location in case she could not be tracked by phone. We tracked respondents who had
moved within the same BRAC branch o¢ce area, but we did not attempt to track respondents
who had moved outside the branch area. As a result, 4 888 (3 522) adolescents were tracked to
midline (endline), corresponding to a two-year (four-year) tracking-rate of 82% (65%).
Table 2 shows correlates of attrition. Considering attrition at midline, Column 1 shows that
residing in a treated community does not predict attrition, and Column 2 shows this to be robust
within branch. Column 3 shows the result holds conditioning on baseline characteristics, and
allowing for there to be di¤erential attrition between treatment and control based on these char-
acteristics (age, current enrollment in school, being married/cohabiting or having children, and
the three empowerment indices that are our key outcomes). None of these characteristics predict
attrition, and we …nd no evidence of di¤erential attrition across treatment and control groups by
these characteristics (at the foot of Column 3, we report the joint F-statistic on the interactions:
they are jointly insigni…cant [ = 712]).
We next examine attrition between baseline and endline (Columns 4-6). Over this four year
period, treatment does not predict attrition, nor do the baseline characteristics of girls, and nor
is there any evidence of di¤erential attrition by these characteristics or measures of empowerment
in treated communities relative to control communities (except for the aspirations index at the
10% level). These interactions are still jointly insigni…cant [ = 156]. Finally, Columns 7 to 9
consider girls tracked at midline and endline. This is the sample used for our endline analysis as
it maintains the greatest comparability between midline and endline estimates. The results are
14
very similar to the earlier …ndings on correlates of being tracked to endline.
The evidence in Table 2 does not shed light on whether attrition is likely to upwards or
downwards bias our estimates. To address issues of selective attrition, we therefore present Lee
bounds estimates of all the midline and endline impacts for economic empowerment (Table 4),
control over the body (Table 5) and aspirations (Table 6) [Lee 2009], where the bounds assume
the tracked sample is either entirely negatively or entirely positively selected.
To better compare our tracking rate with those from studies on similar samples of youth in
low-income settings, we …rst note that most related studies track individuals for one or two years
only. We summarize tracking rates across studies of this type in Figure A1. The horizontal line in
Figure A1 is the attrition rate in our two-year follow-up (18%). This is below or similar to most
related studies, although there are a few studies that report lower attrition [Dupas 2011, Dupas
et al. 2017 and Brudevold-Newman et al. 2017].18 In contrast to some of these studies, around
30% of our baseline sample of girls are already out of school. Hence they are at a stage of the life
cycle where geographic mobility might be high, as they move to …nd employment or marry.
Examining next the handful of studies that have attempted to track young individuals for four
or more years in low-income settings, we note that these typically select a random subsample for
intensive tracking, and observations are then weighted accordingly to maintain representativeness
[Du‡o et al. 2015, Baird et al. 2016, Friedman et al. 2016, Du‡o et al. 2017]. In contrast, we
attempted to track all adolescent girls from our baseline.19
Table A1 presents a complete set of balance checks for our baseline sample of 5 966 interviewed
girls, irrespective of whether they attrit or not, and the sample of girls tracked and midline and
endline that are used for the core ITT analysis. This shows that on most dimensions in the
18Dupas [2011] tracks a sample of girls and boys in Kenya, who recently graduated from primary school. Her
attrition rate is 2% over one year. Dupas et al. [2017] track a sample of teenage girls in Cameroon who were
attending 8th grade at baseline. To reduce attrition, they collected information on girls who could not be reached
by surveying a relative or a friend (for a subset of objective outcomes). The attrition rate overall was 8% over
approximately one year. For face-to-face interviews (as in our study), the attrition rate was 134%. Brudevold-
Newman et al. [2017] track a sample of young women (aged 18-19) living in poor neighborhoods of Nairobi who
had applied to a business training program. They report an attrition rate of 8% over two years. In contrast to their
sampling strategy, our sample is not conditional on expressing interest in business training. If interest in business
training is negatively correlated to geographical mobility, this could explain their lower attrition rate.
19Du‡o et al. [2015] report an attrition rate of 11% over 7 years for a sample of young women in Kenya
(the attrition rate is 7% for boys of same age group). Part of the sample was selected for intensive tracking, which
involved teams of …eld o¢cers travelling to various locations in Kenya and Uganda to identify and interview selected
respondents. In the sample without intensive tracking, the attrition rate was 45%. Baird et al. [2016] report an
attrition rate of 16% over 10 years (for the Kenya Life Panel Survey Round 2). Similar to Du‡o et al. [2015], a
random subsample were tracked intensively. Friedman et al. [2016] track a sample of adolescent girls aged 13-17 in
Kenya, reporting an attrition rate of 18% over 4-5 years. To minimize attrition, they followed a similar strategy to
Du‡o et al. [2015] where a random subsample of baseline respondents were selected for intensive tracking. Finally,
Du‡o et al. [2017] report an attrition rate of 9% over 8 years in Ghana (where the target population was high-school
students aged 17 at baseline). In order to achieve high tracking rates, mobile phones were distributed at the onset
of the study to each participant and they were sent mobile phone credit twice a year as an incentive to keep the
phone number active (as in our study). They were attempted to be reached over phone every year in order to
update the contact information.
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estimation sample, treatment and control groups are balanced. In this sample, the null of equal
means is rejected for only one out of the twenty-one outcomes considered. Moreover, there are no
large di¤erences between the characteristics of girls in the estimation and baseline samples. This
con…rms the …ndings from Table 2, that attrition is not predicted by observables.
3.2.4 Participation in ELA Clubs
Table 3 documents participation in ELA clubs at midline and endline. The majority of adolescent
girls have heard of the clubs by midline. At this time, the participation rate for ELA clubs among
eligible adolescents in treated communities is 21%: this is the period over which vocational skills
and life skills are provided. There is no drop o¤ in continued participation to endline, suggesting
there is value to girls being able to enjoy the safe space the clubs provide.
The practicalities of program implementation, especially in more urban districts, lead to a
small possibility that an adolescent girl residing in a control community is able to attend an ELA
club.20 As Table 3 shows, 47% of girls in control communities (77 girls) have ever participated
in ELA club activities by midline. This participation does not persist: more then 75% of the girls
that initially attended from control communities had dropped out by six months prior to midline.
The remaining rows in Table 3 report statistics conditional on club participation in treated
communities. We focus on treatment communities as the number of regular participants from
control communities is negligible. In treated communities, the majority of adolescents who have
ever participated in ELA club activities continue to be engaged through to midline. Nearly half
of all participants have attended club meetings one or twice a week over the …rst two years of
the club’s operation. Hence, the intervention amounts to a considerable time investment for
participants, and it is plausible that such an intense intervention permanently shifts the level of
human capital accumulated, which, in turn, drives economic and social empowerment.
By midline, 53% (85%) of club participants have taken part in the vocational skills (life skills)
training. The majority (51%) report having received both forms of training; we infer that 33%
take-up only life skills training, and nearly all that take-up vocational skills training also take
up life skills training. Revealed preference therefore suggests the two training components are
complementary for just over half the girls, while for the others they take up the o¤er of one form
of training. Of course, all girls can also potentially bene…t from the safe space ELA clubs provide.21
Table A2 shows characteristics of participants and non-participants in treatment communities
(as measured at midline, once all training had been delivered and using the sample of girls tracked
20In some urban areas, the distance to the nearest club can be similar in treatment and control communities. In
rural locations, most clubs are located in the center of treated communities.
21This variation in skills training is not driven by supply side constraints. In nearly all treated communities
we observe: (i) some eligible girls taking-up a component and other girls not doing so; (ii) the vast majority of
eligible girls report life and livelihood skills training as being available even if they don’t themselves take-up the
course(s). In addition, we do not …nd school enrolment at baseline to be a signi…cant determinant of enrolment in
the vocational training component: this is as expected given clubs operate out of school hours.
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to endline). The …nal three rows show that participants do not appear to be strongly selected
on the three aggregate indices of empowerment, but there is a slight tendency for girls with a
higher control over the body index measure to participate. Overall then, there is little evidence of
selection on observables into ELA participation. Our core analysis presents ITT estimates of the
ELA intervention. We later extend our research design to estimate marginal treatment e¤ects,
shedding light on the nature of participation into ELA.22
3.3 Estimation
As club participation is voluntary, we focus on intent-to-treat (ITT) impacts for our core analysis,
estimated using the following OLS ANCOVA speci…cation for the impact on outcome  for
adolescent  in community , separately for midline ( = 1) and endline ( = 2),
 = +  + 0 + 0 +  (1)
 equals one if individual  is in a community assigned to be treated and zero otherwise.

1
and 
2
are the coe¢cients of interest from the midline and endline speci…cations, measuring
the ITT impact of the ELA program at midline and endline respectively. 0 controls for the
adolescent’s age at baseline ( = 0), and we also include a series of dummies for our randomization
strata (i.e. branch) [Bruhn and McKenzie 2009]. 0 is the outcome at baseline, and  is a
disturbance term clustered by community .23
To account for attrition, we bound the treatment estimates using the trimming procedure
proposed by Lee [2009]. This can be performed for the midline and endline samples separately,
hence the motivation for using the speci…cation above for each sample, rather than pooling survey
waves into a single speci…cation. We later present a robustness check running such a pooled
speci…cation. As Lee [2009] discusses, using covariates to trim the samples yields tighter bounds.
In our setting, sample sizes dictate that we cannot use any covariates to perform the trimming.
Hence when showing the Lee bounds estimates, we present comparable ITT estimates that do not
condition on covariates: these ITT estimates are always guaranteed to lie within the estimated
Lee bounds (unlike the ITT estimates from (1) that condition on baseline covariates).24
22There is a nominal fee due for club attendance but in practice this is often waived (and this is common
knowledge). Hence unobserved credit constraints are unlikely to drive non-participation.
23To check whether the midline impacts pick up anticipation e¤ects of the future o¤er of micro…nance, we use
the sample of 100 treated communities and estimate whether future random assignment to micro…nance predicts
midline outcomes. Reassuringly, for nearly all outcomes, we …nd no signi…cant anticipation impacts of future
assignment to micro…nance.
24The procedure trims observations from above (below) in the group with lower attrition, to equalize the number
of observations in treatment and control groups. It then re-estimates the program impact in the trimmed sample
to deliver the lower (upper) bounds for the true treatment e¤ect (as well as standard errors for each bound). The
bounding procedure relies on the assumptions that treatment is assigned randomly and that treatment a¤ects
attrition in only one direction so there are no heterogeneous e¤ects of the treatment on attrition/selection: this is
in line with the evidence on attrition in Table 2.
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4 Core Results
4.1 Economic Empowerment
Table 4 summarizes the ITT impacts of the program on dimensions of economic empowerment
at midline and endline. To benchmark magnitudes, Column 1 shows the level (and standard
deviation) of the outcome at baseline in control communities. Column 2 then shows the number
of adolescents used to estimate the midline and endline ITTs respectively. Columns 3 and 4
report the ITT estimates from (1) at midline and endline (so conditional on a full set of baseline
covariates); Columns 5 and 6 report unconditional ITT estimates to maintain consistency with
the Lee bounds treatment e¤ect estimates (and their associated standard error).
Row 1 shows the impact on self-reported entrepreneurial skills (recall that these were already
quite high at baseline). The midline ITT estimate shows an increase of 8% over its baseline value,
and at endline this is sustained at a 3% increase. Figures 3A and 3B presents spider graphs showing
the midline and endline ITT impacts (and their associated 95% con…dence interval) for each
component of the entrepreneurial skills score. Strikingly, the program increases entrepreneurial
skills on all ten dimensions at midline: girls in treatment communities perceive themselves as
having better entrepreneurial skill than girls in control communities in terms of being able to
run a business, identifying business opportunities, obtaining and managing capital, managing
employees, bargaining over input and output prices, protecting assets and collecting debts. Hence
relative to girls in control communities at midline, this is an across-the-board shift in treated girls’
self-perceived ability to run small businesses.
We next analyze whether this translates into actual labor market activities of adolescent girls.
We …nd that eligible girls are 68pp (49pp) more likely to be engaged in any income generating
activity at midline (endline), a 66% (49%) increase over the baseline mean. Improvements in
human capital related to entrepreneurial ability are therefore re‡ected in economically signi…cant
improvements in labor force participation particularly in skilled jobs which has been a key driver of
women’s economic empowerment across the developed and developing world [Goldin 2006, Du‡o
2012, Doepke et al. 2012, Jayachandran 2015].
Rows 3 and 4 show this increase is entirely driven by adolescent girls engaging in self-employment
activities. At midline, rates of self-employment are near double those in control communities at
baseline (122pp versus 63pp). At endline these rates remain 50% higher (at 95pp). Taking into
account selective attrition, the Lee bounds estimates remain away from zero: the lower bound
endline estimate corresponds to a 48% increase in self-employment over baseline levels.
These results show a drop o¤ in self-employment activities between midline and endline. If
such activities are established in the …rst year of the program, the magnitudes imply an average
death rate of 15% from the …rst year until endline. To check the plausibility of this, we link to
the results on the death of small businesses in McKenzie and Pa¤hausen [2017]. They collate
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data from 16 panel surveys in 12 low-income countries, documenting that small …rms die at an
average rate of 83% per year over their …rst …ve years of establishment. They …nd younger …rms
are more likely to die (17% of …rms die in their …rst year), and that death rates are higher for
younger entrepreneurs, and for female owners (they are 2pp more likely to die at each …rm age).
Our …ndings are not altogether di¤erent from these rates based on this evidence from multiple
comparable settings.
Income is noisily measured in this kind of context where adolescent girls can be engaged
in multiple work activities over a year, some of which are casual employment. Hence we use
expenditures to proxy income. Row 5 shows that on expenditures in the last month, there are
signi…cant gains to girls in treated communities, corresponding to 39% increases at midline over
baseline, but that these fade (and become more imprecisely measured) at endline.25
We summarize the impacts of the program on economic empowerment by constructing an
overall index of outcomes as described earlier, where the subcomponents are those in Rows 1
to 5. The …nal row in Table 4 shows the ITT e¤ect estimates on this economic empowerment
index: at midline the program has an e¤ect size of 269, that is signi…cant at the 1% level;
by endline this falls to .131, but the impact remains signi…cant at the 5% level. Columns
5 and 6 show both impacts to be robust to selective attrition. For example, the bounds at
endline suggest: (i) if attrited girls are negatively selected, then the upper bound ITT estimate on
economic empowerment is 186; (ii) if attrited girls are positively selected, then the lower bound
ITT estimate on economic empowerment is 090; (iii) both bounds are signi…cantly di¤erent
from zero at conventional levels.
Overall, these results suggests that a multifaceted skills intervention such as ELA has quanti-
tatively signi…cant impacts on adolescent girls’ economic empowerment. The documented impacts
are encouraging relative to the impact evaluations of programs delivering standalone entrepre-
neurship training – see for example Field et al. [2010], Karlan and Valdivia [2011], Drexler et al.
[2014], Fairlie et al. [2015] and Bruhn et al. [2018], or the review of such evidence in McKenzie
and Woodru¤ [2013].26 This is despite the fact that other programs are often speci…cally tar-
25The …rst Row in Table A3 shows impacts on annual earnings, albeit with the caveat that earnings are di¢cult to
measure precisely in low-income settings especially when generated through self-employment. The results suggest
that by endline, annual earnings of girls increase threefold. The point estimate is UGX85K, corresponding to US$50
in 2008 prices, which is economically signi…cant. We have also explored treatment e¤ects on earnings from self
and wage-employment separately (results not shown). As expected, earnings from self-employment signi…cantly
increase, while there is no impact on earnings from wage-employment. Estimating midline (endline) ITT impacts
on annual earnings from self-employment from a Tobit speci…cation we …nd that: (i) on the extensive margin,
adolescent girls are 45pp (36pp) more likely to have some earnings from self-employment, corresponding to a
102% (79%) increase over baseline levels; (ii) on the intensive margin, self-employment earnings increase by nearly
…ve times their baseline level at midline (and by more than six times their baseline value at endline). On the
intensive margin we …nd the proportionate impact on earnings from self-employment to be larger than on hours
worked in self-employment, indicating the marginal product of labor for adolescent girls in self-employment rises
as a consequence of the combined skills provided by the program.
26Field et al. [2010] evaluate the provision of basic …nancial literacy training to female entrepreneurs in India.
Only a socially unrestricted sub-group bene…ted in terms of business income and borrowings. Drexler et al. [2014]
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geted towards those who have self-selected to be small-scale entrepreneurs. Our evidence suggests
that a multifaceted intervention that bundles multiple types of hard and soft skills, designed to
simultaneously empower girls on economic and social margins, as well as providing a safe space
for girls to socialize, can lead to signi…cant improvements in business skills and engagement in
self-employment even among girls who ex ante, might not consider themselves as being on the
margin of being an entrepreneur.27
Finally, we consider whether the time spent at ELA clubs is a complement or substitute
for time spent in formal education. The possibility of substitutability arises because, despite
clubs operating outside of school hours, some eligibles are of school going age. Panel B of Table
A3 examines education related impacts. This con…rms: (i) ELA does not signi…cantly increase
drop out rates for formal education, either at midline or endline; (ii) among those in school,
the ELA program marginally increases their hours of study at midline; (iii) among those that
have dropped out of school at baseline, the program motivates a signi…cantly higher proportion
of dropped out girls to consider going back to school. In short, the evidence suggests the ELA
program increases the value attached to formal education in treated communities, and the earlier
documented increased rates of self-employment do not come at the expense of school enrolment.
4.2 Control Over the Body
Table 5 shows ITT impacts on control over the body for adolescent girls, as measured through
outcomes such as childbearing, marriage and sex. Rows 1 and 2 cover the critical issues of whether
the program a¤ects early childbearing and marriage, two of the most signi…cant roadblocks to
adolescent girls acquiring human capital and fully participating in labor markets. The program
has a strong negative impact on early childbearing: the ITT impact at midline in Column 3 shows
the probability of having a child is 27pp lower in treated communities than control communities:
given that at baseline 113% of girls have at least one child, this corresponds to a 24% drop in
fertility rates over a two year period. If we consider that fertility rates rise between baseline and
endline from 105% to 123% in control communities as girls get older, the ITT estimate implies
…nd that teaching accounting principles to micro-borrowers in the Dominican Republic has no impact on the way
they run their business or business outcomes. However, simple rule-of-thumb style training does a¤ect …nancial
record keeping. Karlan and Valdivia [2011] investigate the impact of an intense training intervention of up to
two years, that delivered training on business practices to clients of a Peruvian Micro…nance institution. Despite
improving business knowledge, the intervention failed to impact business outcomes. Fairlie et al. [2015] …nd that
providing entrepreneurs training has no long-run measurable impact on business operations. On the other hand,
Bruhn et al. [2018] suggest granting small and medium enterprises in Mexico access to consulting services, that are
much more costly than the forms of business intervention described above, has large positive impacts on pro…ts,
but not on employment.
27A second natural point of comparison is with the literature evaluating standalone vocational training interven-
tions. Such hard skills interventions are often found to have limited impacts in developed [Card et al. 2010] and
developing countries [Card et al. 2011, Groh et al. 2012]. Among studies …nding impacts, Attanasio et al. [2011]
show that for women, the likelihood of being employed increases by 61pp. This impact is slightly larger than
those we …nd for the ELA intervention, although as we discuss later, the ELA program is signi…cantly cheaper, and
designed to be scalable in the context of Sub-Saharan Africa.
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this natural rate of increase is eliminated in treatment communities where adolescent girls largely
forego reproduction once the program is o¤ered. These trends continue to endline, at which point
girls in treated communities are 38pp less likely to have a child than girls in control communities.
Delaying the onset of marriage is an important mechanism through which adolescent girls can
improve their long term earnings potential [Field and Ambrus 2008, Baird et al. 2011]. Along this
margin the program also has noteworthy impacts: the midline ITT estimate shows girls in treated
communities to be 69pp less likely to be married/cohabiting at follow up, corresponding to 53% of
the baseline mean. In control communities marriage rates for adolescent girls rise naturally from
12% to 18% from baseline to follow-up, and the evidence suggests this is almost entirely prevented
from happening by the program in treatment communities. This divergence in trends continues
to endline, at which point they are 8pp less likely to be married or cohabiting.
In Row 3 we see the rate of adolescents who report having had sex unwillingly during the past
year is 61pp lower in treated communities at midline and 53pp lower at endline. Starting from a
baseline of 17% in control communities, this corresponds to a near 30% reduction in the incidence
of such events by endline. This impact is likely a direct result of three program features: (i) girls
being able to act on speci…c soft skills accumulated through the life skills sessions on negotiation,
rape and legal rights, as well as improved knowledge of reproductive health; (ii) the additional
vocational skills provided raise girls’ engagement in and earnings from self-employment, and such
economic empowerment likely reinforces girls’ control over their bodies [Baird et al. 2011, 2014];
(iii) clubs providing a safe location for girls, especially in the after-school period when their parents
might not be back from work.
The program also signi…cantly improves girl’s health related knowledge, on a basic question
related to pregnancy (Row 4) and as measured by a HIV-related knowledge index (Row 5).
In terms of sexual behaviors, in Row 6 we see that condom use increases by midline among
sexually active girls: the percentage of girls who always use a condom when having intercourse
is 13pp higher, although again this impact dies out by endline. On the other hand, Lee bounds
estimates at endline (that do not control for any covariates) remain signi…cantly di¤erent from
zero.28 Row 7 shows that among the sexually active there is little evidence that other forms of
contraceptive use increase. This is reassuring because although girls are encouraged to use various
forms of contraception, there is limited availability of such alternatives in these communities.
Hence the results do not seem to re‡ect girls merely repeating what they have been taught in life
skills courses.29
28As argued in Dupas [2011], childbearing is not a perfect proxy for the incidence of risky sex because: (i) adoles-
cent girls in long-term relationships are more likely to get pregnant than girls in several short-term relationships; (ii)
teenage girls might be more likely to abort if the father is a teenage boy who cannot provide economic support; (iii)
adolescent girls might be more likely to engage in anal sex with partners to avoid pregnancy, and this is especially
risky for HIV transmission. The concern that such changes in behavior might be driving fertility drops is partly
ameliorated by the increased self-reported condom usage.
29A recent trend in the literature examining interventions to reduce risky behaviors has been towards the collection
of bio-markers rather than relying on self-reports that are often argued to be more unreliable. Corno and de Paula
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Aggregating all these margins of control over the body into a single index, we see the ITT
e¤ect size is to increase the index by 535 at midline, and by 269 at endline, which are both
larger point estimates relative to the earlier documented impact on economic empowerment index
in Table 4. Moreover, all the Lee bounds estimates on the index are signi…cantly di¤erent from
zero at midline and endline.
We brie‡y compare our …ndings to results from interventions that target outcomes relating
speci…cally to the realm of control over the body, for adolescent girls in similar contexts. Perhaps
the largest body of such work in similar contexts relates to standalone HIV-education programs.
However, meta-analyses generally report weak impacts of such standalone programs, irrespective
of whether they are delivered via classroom-based courses [Gallant and Maticka-Tyndale 2004,
McCoy et al. 2010, Du‡o et al. 2015] or peer-provided courses [Cornish and Campbell 2009].
There are two recent studies that …nd impacts of stand alone education programs that are worth
comparing to. First, Arcand and Wouabe [2010] use a regression discontinuity design to estimate
the impacts of a school-based HIV prevention course in Cameroon. Their estimated impacts on
childbearing and condom usage are slightly above the ITT estimates we …nd. Second, Dupas [2011]
uses an RCT design to evaluate the e¤ectiveness of the Kenyan national HIV curriculum relative
to an intervention providing information on the relative risk of HIV infection by the partner’s age.
She …nds that exposure to this curriculum causes a 28% reduction in teenage pregnancies over a
one-year period, and the key mechanism relates to how risks are presented to adolescents.
Finally, all the outcomes shown in Table 5 related to childbearing, marriage and sex, are those
the ELA program speci…cally targets within the life skills component. As such, a concern with
these self-reported outcomes is experimenter demand e¤ects [Zizzo 2010]. However, this alone
would not explain the di¤erential pattern of some e¤ects strengthening over time (such as on
childbearing and marriage) and other e¤ects attenuating over time (such as contraceptive use).
We directly address the issue below, once we have also discussed the program impacts on girls’
beliefs and aspirations.
4.3 Aspirations
We complete our core analysis by considering ITT e¤ects on girl’s perception of gender roles, and
aspirations related to marriage and childbearing: these serve as markers for the program impacting
deep rooted social norms about girls’ role in society and lifetime opportunities, which might be far
harder to shift than the accumulation of human capital focused on so far. The results are in Table
6. The …rst outcome is an aggregate gender empowerment index which re‡ects how girls perceive
their role in various tasks related to the labor market and in the household. The other outcomes
are girls’ aspirations over ages at marriage for themselves and their children, desired fertility and
[2018] test this claim by developing and calibrating a model of STIs: they identify conditions under which self-reports
can be more reliable than bio-markers, where these conditions depend on the prevalence of STIs and properties of
the epidemiological model of infection.
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aspirations over age at …rst childbirth. The program does not explicitly target these attitudes,
but they might well be altered alongside changes in economic empowerment and control over the
body that are targeted and causally impacted.
The overall picture from these aspirations related outcomes are that although the program has
impacts on most dimensions in the short term, these tend to nearly always die out by endline, as
seen clearly contrasting impacts between Columns 3 and 4. This is best illustrated in the …nal row
where all outcomes are incorporated into an aspirations index z-score: at midline this signi…cantly
increases by 269 (an e¤ect size comparable to that found in Dhar et al. 2018), but by endline,
there is no statistical di¤erence between adolescent girls in treatment and control communities.
While these results help reassure against the concern that the earlier results are driven merely by
reporting bias or experimenter demand e¤ects, they also serve to highlight the great challenge in
being able to permanently shift aspirations, even when girls’ economic and social empowerment
have improved in treated communities.
There are however two notable dimensions of aspirational changes that do persist, and these
both relate to the earlier documented impacts in terms of control over the body. The …rst is shown
in Row 2: girl’s views on ideal ages at marriage for women in society as a whole. Adolescent girls
in treated communities report signi…cantly higher ages of 77 and 23 years at midline and endline.
As not all ages of marriage are logically feasible, an appropriate way to benchmark these impacts
is relative to the standard deviation of baseline responses (rather than their mean value). The
ITT impacts then correspond to a shift in expectations on age at marriage for women of around
25% (8%) of a standard deviation at midline (endline). If unmarried at follow-up, we also asked
girls about their expected age at the time of their own marriage: the di¤erence between girls in
treatment and control communities is almost one year (not shown).30
The second longer lasting dimension along which aspirations are shifted relate to childbearing:
Row 5 shows there are signi…cant increases in what girls report being the most suitable age for
women to have their …rst child at both midline and endline: the ITT estimates are 619 and 272
respectively, corresponding to 20% and 9% of the baseline standard deviation, respectively.
Both longer lasting changes in aspirations related to age at marriage and at …rst child were
earlier picked up in actual behaviors, where we documented signi…cant reductions in fertility and
marriage among treated girls relative to controls. In order to more permanently shift some of the
other dimensions, one avenue for future interventions to consider is to also target fathers and other
men in the communities.
30Adolescent girls were also asked who they thought would be involved in deciding their marriage partners (not
shown). We …nd that among treated girls there is a signi…cant reduction in the likelihood they report the choice will
be made by them alone, and a corresponding increase of similar magnitude in the likelihood they report decisions
over marriage partners will be made in conjunction with their parents. This might be taken as tentative evidence
that higher quality marriage partners being sought, as well as changes in the timing of marriage.
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4.4 Robustness
We brie‡y describe robustness checks on the impacts of ELA on the indices of empowerment, at
midline and endline. First, we more fully exploit the panel dimension of the data to present ITT
estimates using a speci…cation pooling both post-intervention survey waves.31 Table A4 shows
the quantitative and qualitative pattern of results remains the same as discussed above: all three
indices are impacted at midline, the impacts are largest for the control over the body index, and
only the impacts on the aspirations index fade at endline.
Second, we probe whether subsamples of adolescent girls drive the core impacts. Panel A of
Table A5 presents results on impact heterogeneity along the following dimensions: (i) rural versus
urban households; (ii) rich versus poor households, as de…ned by whether the household’s asset
values at baseline are above or below the median for all households; (iii) girls aged above/below
16 at baseline. We …nd the impacts to be largely homogeneous across these dimensions (consistent
with the earlier descriptive that all three indices of empowerment are not strongly correlated to
household wealth). The results for younger girls are encouraging given the conventional wisdom
that girls aged 10-14, particularly those out of school, face the greatest economic challenges and
health challenges arising from unsafe sexual behavior in this context [UNICEF 2003].
Panel B of Table 5 examines heterogeneous impacts on education related outcomes. These
impacts are also similar across the three dimensions at midline and endline. In particular, the
…nding that the program does not encourage girls to drop out of school applies equally to rural
and urban areas, rich and poor households, and young and old girls. This is again encouraging: if,
for example, girls were myopic, the incentives to drop out of school in the presence of the program
might be higher in rural areas where the returns to education are lower.
Third, we probe the notion that parent-child relations might correlate to how girls respond
to the program. For example, parental beliefs over the ideal age of marriage for a woman, or
beliefs related to gender norms might constrain girls to lower levels of empowerment [Bursztyn
and Co¤man 2012, Ashraf et al. 2017, Dhar et al. 2018]. Table A6 examines the issue by
presenting results on impact heterogeneity along those dimensions of baseline parental belief. We
…nd ITT impacts to be largely homogeneous across parental beliefs, and this is the case for the
three indices of empowerment (Panel A) as well as education related outcomes (Panel B).
4.5 Experimenter Demand E¤ects
As described earlier, a concern with self-reported impacts is that they re‡ect experimenter demand
e¤ects or social desirability biases [Zizzo 2010]. This is especially the case for the outcomes related
31More precisely we estimate,  = +
X

 ( £) + 0 + 0 +1 + , where  ( = 1 2)
is a survey wave dummy, and the coe¢cients of interest are (1,2).
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to economic empowerment and control over the body, as the program targets these outcomes.32
Experimenter demand e¤ects can be generally classi…ed as either cognitive or social. Cognitive
drivers could be present if adolescent girls believe providing desirable responses will improve their
chances to access other BRAC programs (e.g. credit). If so, we might expect such e¤ects to be
greater for participants from lower socioeconomic backgrounds or those in rural areas. However,
this implication runs counter to the evidence in Table A5, where we documented relatively ho-
mogenous impacts across indices and time periods, between rich/poor and rural/urban households.
Social drivers relate to subjects being motivated to adjust reports towards what they expect
researchers want to observe. To address this, we follow the approach suggested by Dhar et al.
[2018], by examining whether our …ndings di¤er by a measure of respondent’s social desirability.
Given our data, the social desirability score we use is based on the score respondent’s assigned to
the statement, ‘I want to be a respectful person in my village.’ Respondents were asked whether
this statement is true on a scale of 1-10, where 1 indicated “not at all” and 10 indicated “a lot”.33
Table A7 then shows whether the ITT impacts of ELA vary with respondent’s social desirability
score: we do not …nd any evidence of heterogenous treatment impacts by this measure. This is the
case for all three indices of empowerment, and for impacts at midline and endline. Moreover, for
most interactions, the point estimate is close to zero (and vary in sign) and precisely estimated.34
5 Discussion
5.1 Spillovers
The ITT impacts along all three dimensions of female empowerment are economically as well as
statistically signi…cant: these are summarized again in Column 1 of Table 7, Panel A shows results
for midline, and Panel B shows them for endline. At the same time, ELA participation rates are
32To validate some answers during data collection, enumerator team leaders checked parts of the data for accuracy
by revisiting respondents. During these re-visits, the team leaders took the questionnaires (which were on paper)
with them and veri…ed that some observable characteristics had been correctly recorded. For example, they would
check if the respondents had a plot (of land) or chickens if they reported being engaged in such activities. We did
not triangulate any personal information (such as marital history) with others due to con…dentiality.
33Dhar et al. [2018] evaluate the e¤ects of a school-based gender equality training program in India on adolescents’
gender attitudes. To test for social desirability bias, they use an index of social desirability based on Crowne and
Marlowe 1960). They do not …nd evidence of such respondent behavior.
34de Quidt et al. [2018] develop a methodology to quantify experimenter demand e¤ects in lab experiments. By
providing explicit cues about the hypotheses associated with the experiment to randomly selected subsamples, their
methodology provides upper and lower bounds on demand-free behavior. They …nd that women are more subject to
demand e¤ects than men. On the other hand, they conclude, “Across eleven canonical experimental tasks we …nd
modest responses to demand manipulations that explicitly signal the researcher’s hypothesis...We argue that these
treatments reasonably bound the magnitude of demand e¤ects in typical experiments, so our …ndings give cause for
optimism.” Mummolo and Peterson [2018] also explicitly test for experimenter demand e¤ects and also …nd that
revealing the purpose of the experiment to subjects does not change …ndings. Notwithstanding these optimistic
…ndings, we suggest that future research on the e¤ects of interventions in the …eld with a gender-empowerment
focus could adopt such methodologies to quantify experimenter demand e¤ects in …eld contexts.
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just over 20% (Table 3). These combined …ndings beg the question of whether the documented
impacts arise from participants alone, or whether there are spillovers onto non-participating ado-
lescent girls in treated communities. To see the issue most starkly, Column 2 in Table 7 reports
the 2SLS impacts of participation, where we follow standard practice and instrument participa-
tion with treatment o¤er, so these estimates just scale-up the ITT e¤ects by the di¤erence in
participation rates between treated and control communities. The 2SLS estimates re‡ect average
treatment e¤ects (absent spillovers) if there are homogeneous gains across girls. While baseline
levels of empowerment are certainly low, the magnitude of these e¤ect sizes are hard to reconcile
with low participation rates if there are homogenous returns to participation.
We thus examine the issue in more detail using two strategies: (i) presenting descriptive evi-
dence on the potential nature of spillovers; (ii) extending our research design to estimate marginal
treatment e¤ects of ELA.
5.1.1 Impacts on Non-Participants
To build a more detailed picture on the nature of any spillovers, we consider the following non-
experimental comparisons: (i) participants in treated communities to non-participants in control
communities; (ii) non-participants in treated and control communities. Participation is endogenous
so these comparisons are likely driven by selection on unobservables and do not represent causal
impacts (albeit there are few observable di¤erences between participants and non-participants,
Table A2). These results should thus be read as motivation for understanding better the nature of
spillovers that might be present. We deal with selection on unobservables in the next Subsection.
Column 3 in Table 7 reveals that among participants, the point estimate impacts on each
empowerment index at midline and endline are noticeably larger than the baseline ITT estimates.
Column 4 then compares non-participants across treatment and control communities. For all
indices: (i) the impacts are smaller than the baseline ITT estimates; (ii) comparing Columns 3
and 4, the ratio of impacts between participants and non-participants is highest for the aspirations
index (at midline this is 61%), next highest for the control over the body index (46%), and rather
low for the economic empowerment index (17%). These results are suggestive of there being
spillovers, that are greater for dimensions of empowerment captured in the aspirations and control
over the body indices, and weaker for forms of economic empowerment. This pattern makes sense
as what girls learn from the life skills training may be easier to transmit to other girls relative to
what they learn from vocational skills training.
5.1.2 Selection into Participation
To understand selection on unobservables into participation, we estimate marginal treatment ef-
fects (MTEs). This sheds light on whether there are heterogenous returns to ELA participation,
the nature of self-selection into participation (thus identifying the girls driving spillovers), and
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allows us to use other relevant treatment e¤ects to bound the magnitude of any spillover e¤ects.
The basic set-up can be explained using the standard potential outcomes framework.35 Let
 denote the potential outcome (empowerment) for girl  in treatment state  2 f0 1g:  =
()+, where () is the conditional mean of  given (), and(0j) = 0. We assume
a latent discrete choice model for girl ’s ELA participation, so if ¤ denotes the latent net gain
from participation, ¤ = ( )¡, and  = 1 if ¤ ¸ 0,  = 0 otherwise. The instrument
 is excluded from the potential outcomes equation, and  is an iid error term. The unobserved
trait  therefore makes girl  less likely to participate in ELA. Re-writing the participation model
as ( ) ¸  and applying the CDF of  to this we obtain,  (( )) ¸  ().
The left hand side is the probability of participating based on observables: the propensity score,
 ( ). The right hand side,  (), are quantiles of the distribution of unobserved traits,
denoted . The participation decision can thus be re-written as  ( ) ¸ .
The MTE is the treatment e¤ect for a girl with given characteristics at the - quantile of the
 distribution, and it allows the unobserved gains from treatment (1¡0) to be correlated with
unobserved traits that impact participation (). The MTE is identi…ed by the derivative of the
outcome with respect to the propensity score [Heckman et al. 2006, Carneiro et al. 2011]. Hence
to construct the MTE over a range of , we …rst need continuous instrument(s) , and for these
to have enough variation to generate a propensity score for participating and non-participating
individuals, conditional on  = .
Following earlier applications of MTEs on the returns to college/schooling [Carneiro et al.
2011, Nybom 2017], as instruments we use the distance between a girl’s home and the nearest
ELA club (in her community or a control community), distance squared, the treatment dummy,
and interactions of the distance measures with the treatment dummy. We do so for all indices
at midline and endline, and in each we control for the baseline index value. Table A8 shows
the six …rst stage probit regressions, and Figure A2 graphs the estimated propensity scores for
participants and non-participants in each case.36
We make two standard assumptions to simplify estimation of MTEs. First, we condition on
 parametrically, so potential outcomes are  =  + for  2 f0 1g, and the participation
equation becomes ¤ = ( ) ¡ . Second, we assume a joint normal distribution for
0, 1 and  , in which the variance of  is normalized to one, and 0 (1) is the correlation
coe¢cient between 0 (1) and  . While this restriction rules out non-monotonic gains over ,
the parametric model is more precisely estimated given our relatively small sample.
35The method of marginal treatment e¤ects was developed in Bjorklund and Mo¢tt [1987] and Heckman and
Vytlacil [2005, 2007]. We closely follow the exposition in Bel…eld and Rasul [2018] that itself is a simpli…ed version
of the excellent overview on MTE methods provided by Cornelisson et al. [2016].
36For the …rst stage in Table A8, we note that distance measures are available for 84% (86%) of girls tracked
to midline (endline). The instruments predict participation (obviously, more so for those in treated communities).
Figure A2 shows the predicted propensities are right shifted for participants relative to non-participants, but as in
many MTE applications, we have only partial coverage of the propensity over [0 1].
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Figure 4 shows the MTEs at midline and endline for each empowerment index. On each -axis
we have , that is negatively related to unobserved traits making participation more likely, and
is therefore referred to as the unobserved resistance to treatment. The -axis shows the e¤ect
size impacts for an adolescent girl with unobserved traits . Panel A shows that at midline, the
MTEs for economic empowerment are upward sloping in , although the estimates are imprecise.
This implies adolescent girls’ participation decisions display negative selection on gains: those most
likely to participate in ELA (namely, those with the highest unobserved traits at the LHS of the
-axis) gain less from the program on this dimension of empowerment than those less likely to
participate (at the RHS of the -axis). However, the gains from participation are non-negative for
girls over the entire support of , and the MTE is positive for the majority of quantiles. In turn,
this suggests the naive ITT estimate in Column 3 of Table 7 for participants is likely downwards
biased given selection on unobservables, and the ITT estimate in Column 4 on non-participants
is likely upwards biased.
In contrast, for the other dimensions of female empowerment we see strong evidence of partic-
ipation decisions being characterized by positive self-selection on gains: those girls that have the
largest gains from ELA participation on these dimensions of empowerment related to control over
the body and aspirations, are those most likely to actually participate in ELA. For no quantiles
of  do we …nd negative impacts, and the MTE is positive for the majority of quantiles of 
on both these dimensions of empowerment. Hence the corresponding ITT estimates in Column
3 of Table 7 on participants are likely upwards biased given selection on unobservables, and the
estimates in Column 4 on non-participants are likely downwards biased.37
A similar pattern of results holds at endline, except the slope of MTEs on economic empower-
ment becomes even more muted and imprecisely estimated.
These results have the following implications for understanding the nature of gains, participa-
tion, and spillovers from ELA. First, the MTEs rule out homogenous gains to ELA participation
across adolescent girls. While the evidence suggests no girls lose from ELA, the potential gains
from participation vary enormously across girls and dimensions of empowerment.
Second, the pattern of selection into participation is informative for any spillover e¤ects. If
these exist, then for control over the body and aspirations, they transmit from positively selected
girls onto girls whose counterfactual gains from participating would have been smaller. To provide
evidence on the magnitude of spillovers to non-participants relative to their gains from counter-
factually participating, we can integrate over relevantly weighted MTEs to derive: (i) the average
treatment e¤ect (ATE), the average e¤ect of participation if all eligible adolescent girls attended;
(ii) the average treatment on the treated (ATT), namely the average treatment e¤ect on partic-
ipating girls; (iii) the average treatment on the untreated (ATU), namely what would have been
the counterfactual gains to participation for non-participants.
37This …nding was hinted at earlier in Table A2, where the one observable di¤erence between participants and
non-participants was found to be that participants had a higher control over the body index score at baseline.
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Columns 5 to 7 in Table 7 show the results. For economic empowerment, given the MTE
is mildly upward sloping, it follows that      . For control over the body and
aspirations dimensions, with stronger positive self-selection it follows that      .
The ATEs in Column 5 are smaller than the 2SLS in Column 2 (they are also shown on Figure
4): as highlighted above, these estimates diverge because the 2SLS estimates do not account
for the heterogeneity in gains from ELA. Comparing the ratio of ATEs to 2SLS estimates, the
ATEs are 91% as large on economic empowerment, 68% as large on control over the body, and
61% as large on aspirations (with all three being statistically di¤erent from zero). These more
plausible ATEs re‡ect the average gains from ELA if all eligible girls would have participated in
the program. They range from 105 to 232 at midline, falling to 8 at endline for economic
empowerment and control over the body (the impacts on the aspirations index die out by endline,
as with the ITT estimates). These ATEs still however powerfully re‡ect the promise of ELA to
shift adolescent girls’ empowerment.
The ATTs in Column 6 are larger than the ITT impacts on participants in Column 3 for the
dimensions of control over the body and aspirations because of positive selection on gains. The girls
driving spillovers onto others, have greater gains on these margins: comparing ATTs and ATUs
at midline, we see the average gains to participants are more than double those for the average
non-participant. Finally, we note that at midline, the ATUs shown in Column 7 are all much
larger than the impacts on non-participants from Column 4. Given the biases described above in
the ITTs on the non-participant sample, this suggests on economic empowerment, spillover e¤ects
onto non-participants are at least 8% of the impact had non-participants counterfactually actually
participated in ELA, with these ratios being at most 27% for the control over the body index, and
43% for the aspirations index. These provide useful bounds on any spillover e¤ects.
5.1.3 Boys
The discussion above has focused on spillovers from participating adolescent girls onto other girls.
However, spillover e¤ects might also exist for boys. Our evaluation did not survey boys and so we
cannot provide direct evidence on the matter. However, Buehren et al. [2018] conduct a follow-up
experiment in the same communities, this time sampling girls and boys. In particular they choose
a random subsample of girls and boys listed either as the panel respondents in this evaluation, or
their siblings. Buehren et al. [2018] then use a lab-in-the-…eld experiment to elicit a measure of
individual’s willingness to compete, and examine how this is impacted by the ELA intervention.
On girls’ competitiveness they …nd no impact of ELA. However, on boys’ competitiveness they
…nd: (i) in control communities, having an additional sister correlates with a lower competitiveness
score; (ii) in treated communities (i.e. those where ELA was implemented and girls have become
economically and socially empowered), this pattern is reversed. The results in Buehren et al.
[2018] suggest that, in a context where siblings compete for limited parental resources, empowering
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adolescent girls might trigger boys to exhibit greater sibling rivalry, and increasing their taste for
competition. Understanding spillovers across siblings and genders from ELA-style interventions
that are targeted to a speci…c gender, remains a rich area for future study.38
5.2 Unbundling the ELA Components
Women’s empowerment is a multi-dimensional concept, and there are good reasons why these
dimensions might be interlinked. The ELA intervention is a multifaceted intervention designed
to simultaneously raise empowerment along these dimensions. A key strength of the approach
is its potential to give a big push to adolescent girls’ empowerment along these dimensions si-
multaneously and kickstart a virtuous cycle of gains. The downside is that it becomes harder
to disentangle if one program component is more e¤ective in raising empowerment than others.
However, we probe the data a bit further using mediation analysis to shed light on the matter. We
follow Gelbach [2016] in decomposing the overall ITT impacts on each empowerment index, into
components explained by di¤erent potential mediators. Of course, we cannot assign any causal
interpretation to the mediation results, but the analysis provides useful suggestive evidence on
which channels might contribute more signi…cantly to the overall e¤ects on empowerment.
Table 8 reports the mediation analysis, splitting results by each empowerment index. The most
natural set of mediators to consider are participation in the life skills training and participation
in vocational training. As shown in Table 3, 51% of girls receive both forms of training, those
participating in life skills nearly always receiving vocational training, and 33% of participating
girls only obtaining vocational training. The …rst row in each Panel replicates the baseline ITT
estimates. The second row estimates (1) but also controls for the mediators. The di¤erence
between these estimates corresponds to the total mediated e¤ect, shown in the third row of each
panel. The remaining rows then show how much each mediator contributes to explaining this
mediated e¤ect (assuming no complementarity between mediators). Two results emerge.
First, for each dimension of empowerment at midline, life skills training appears an important
mediator. At endline, life skills remains a signi…cant mediator for economic empowerment. Second,
for each dimension of empowerment, there remains a large fraction of the baseline ITT estimates
remaining unexplained by the mediators. For example, this share is 153269 = 66% (76%) for the
economic empowerment index at midline (endline). One possibility is that this unexplained portion
captures the fact that ELA clubs also provide a safe space for girls. They serve as a protected
local space in which adolescent girls can meet, socialize, privately discuss issues of concern and
continue to develop their skills, at a time of day that is after-school but in the afternoon when
their parents might not be back from work. This role of ELA clubs continues beyond midline, and
long after the life skills and vocational skills have been delivered. This is in line with a literature
38There is a nascent evidence base examining how improvements in the human capital of children might lead to
within household spillovers onto siblings (say through changing parental behavior) [Barrera-Osorio et al. 2011, Das
et al. 2013, Ashraf et al. 2017].
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that examines economic returns to social interaction or safe spaces [Feigenberg et al. 2013, Ashraf
et al. 2017, Cai and Szeidl 2018, Bandiera et al. 2018].39
In addition, ELA clubs bring adolescent girls into contact with mentors, that might further
provide useful role models to in‡uence behavior. The ability of various kinds of role model to
improve womens’ empowerment has been shown in other contexts [Jensen and Oster 2009, Beaman
et al. 2012, La Ferrara et al. 2012].
These results are intriguing and at a minimum allowed us to take a …rst step of towards shining
some light into the critical program components. Certainly an important next step for evaluations
of ELA-style multifaceted interventions is to further open the black box of program components
to understand the impacts of each, and complementarities between them.
5.3 Cost E¤ectiveness
The ELA program has proved to be transportable across countries (with modi…cation), having
started in Bangladesh, been tailored to other contexts in South Asia and East Africa, and is now
being piloted in post-con‡ict countries such as Liberia and Sierra Leone. In Uganda, the scalability
and potential cost e¤ectiveness of the program has also been demonstrated through its expansion
to over 1200 clubs.40
Given the gains to adolescent girls accrue through channels of economic and social empower-
ment, many of the gains are unpriced and other will be realized over the life cycle, as vocational
and life skills are accumulated, entry into self-employment is accelerated, and marriage and child
bearing are delayed. It is precisely events such as getting married or having children during
39Feigenberg et al. [2013] show that the frequency of social interaction between micro…nance group members
positively impacted the …nancial performance of the group. Cai and Szeidl [2018] document how randomly assigning
the o¤er to attend business association meetings among owner-managers of Chinese …rms had large positive impacts
on …rm performance, through the formation of business networks through which information was shared and
partnerships formed. There is limited experimental evidence on the impact of safe spaces for adolescent girls in
similar contexts. A notable study is Ashraf et al. [2017], who they evaluate the e¤ects of two interventions targeting
adolescent girls enrolled in primary schools in Zambia: (i) a negotiation-skills training; (ii) a safe-space program.
They …nd that the negotiation skills training led to long-run improvements in human capital outcomes of treated
girls, but the safe space program had no signi…cant e¤ect. In ongoing work, Bandiera et al. [2018] evaluate the ELA
program in Sierra Leone. The intervention takes place during the Ebola crisis, and provides suggestive evidence
that a key role that ELA clubs played during the crisis was to provide a safe space for girls, away from men and
thus less exposed to sexual violence.
40A replication pilot study of the ELA program was also attempted in Tanzania [Buehren et al. 2017] but this
failed due to implementation issues. For example, in Tanzania it turned out to be far harder to secure a safe
space in communities. In many cases, an arrangement with local schools or church had to be found to share space,
and this limited BRAC’s ability to decide on the timing of club activities. In addition, the donated club houses
were often insecure. The provision of materials for the life skills training and quality of vocational training were
other implementation challenges. Adoho et al. [2014] evaluate a program somewhat similar to ELA in Liberia:
their independent replication of the short run (6-month) impacts …nd that adolescent girls in treated communities
increased employment by 47% and earnings by 80% relative to girls in control communities. Their impact evaluation
documents positive e¤ects on a variety of empowerment measures, including access to money, self-con…dence, and
anxiety about circumstances and the future. The evaluation found no net impact on fertility or sexual behavior,
suggesting those channels might take longer to work through.
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adolescence which interrupt human capital accumulation and thus permanently and signi…cantly
adversely a¤ect the lifetime earnings potential of women across the developing world. There is
also a literature which suggests that having sex against one’s will seriously lowers lifetime incomes
[MacMillan 2011]. Monetizing all these gains in a sensible way is beyond the scope of this paper,
but they are likely to be substantial. Given this, we do not attempt to calculate the internal rate
of return of the program. Rather, we conduct the more modest task of describing the program
cost structure and using the endline results to gauge how large the bene…ts would have to be for
the program to be cost e¤ective at endline (ignoring any potential spillover e¤ects).
Table 9 categorizes the program’s …xed and variable costs, where variable costs depend on the
number of participating girls. Depending on whether the costs are incurred once only or recur
each month, we list the amounts in Column 1 or 2 respectively. Columns 3 and 4 then split each
cost into its …rst year, and subsequent year components respectively. All costs are in 2008 US$.
Rows 1 to 3 show the costs associated with the initial program investment of setting up a
program o¢ce, training of program sta¤ and program manual development. The second set of
…xed costs in Rows 4 to 14 comprise all cost items that are necessary to provide the infrastructure
for the ELA clubs to function (irrespective of the number of actual club participants). Finally,
Rows 15 to 19 detail the variable costs of the program. Summing across all costs in the 100 treated
communities, Row 20 shows that in year one, the program costs $365 690. This falls to $232 240
in year two onwards as some set-up costs are not recurring. This somewhat overestimates the total
program costs because some of these resources would have been put to another overlapping use
in the absence of the program. However, as it is impossible to accurately measure what fraction
of these costs would still have be reallocated to other uses, we include them all as program costs
and so bias the results against yielding a positive net gain.
Our pre-baseline census listing of all households revealed that around 130 eligible adolescent
girls resided in the average community. Given the bene…ts we document relate to ITT estimates of
residing in a community that is o¤ered the ELA program (and we have no reliable way to estimate
spillover e¤ects), we use this number of eligible girls to calculate the per girl cost of the program.
Hence in the fourth panel of Table 6, Rows 21 and 22 show the average …xed and variable costs
per eligible girl. The overall cost per eligible is shown in Row 23. Given our ITT estimates are
measured four-years after the baseline, we focus on the fourth year per-girl cost of $179.
To put the cost estimate in context, we note that $179 corresponds to less than 1% of household
annual incomes at baseline. If the per girl bene…ts to an adolescent girl residing in a community
that is o¤ered the ELA program are larger than this, the program is sustainable from the social
planner’s perspective.41
As mentioned above, monetizing the bene…ts of the program is not straightforward because
the main gains will be over the life cycle or unpriced and so hard to value. The impacts of the
41We do not factor in the opportunity cost of time of attending the ELA clubs. We do however know that
attendance does not come at the cost of reduced participation in formal schooling, as shown in Tables A4 and A6.
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program can be crudely monetized using the ITT estimate on annual earnings at endline. The
…nal row of Table 9 shows this endline increase of $50 (taken from Table A3, and is signi…cantly
di¤erent from zero). This more than o¤sets the per girl program cost.
Even if the bene…ts of the program outweigh its costs, the question of whether the same
resources could be spent more e¤ectively remains open. As discussed earlier, the bundled ELA
intervention appears to improve outcomes at least as well as single-pronged interventions that have
focused on classroom-based education courses designed to reduce risky behaviors, or exclusively
on vocational training designed to improve labor market outcomes among youth. However, one
class of vocational training programs that has met with some success are the Jovenes programs
implemented throughout Latin America. For example, Attanasio et al. [2011] …nd that for the
Jovenes program in Colombia, among women, the likelihood to be employed increases by 61pp,
which is a larger impact than we …nd for the bundled ELA intervention. However the costs per
trainee of the Jovenes programs vary from $600 to $2000 per participant served [World Bank
2009]. These costs are still an order of magnitude larger than the $179 per eligible girl of the
ELA program, or given a 21% take-up rate, a cost of $85 per participating adolescent girl.
Another approach to understand whether the ELA program is socially bene…cial is to consider
the impacts of providing unconditional cash transfers in a similar setting. This is precisely what
is considered in Blattman et al. [2014], who present evidence from the Youth Opportunities
program (YOP) using a randomized control trial in which youth were given unconditional and
unsupervised cash transfers.42 They …nd that almost 80% of youth chose to spend these transfers
on acquiring vocational skills and tools, and that the resultant increase in earnings imply an annual
return on capital of 35% on average. There are of course many di¤erences between the treated
individuals in the ELA and YOP programs: the YOP targets both genders and those aged 16 to
35; individuals form groups to apply for the unconditional transfers; the per person transfer $374.
Although the ELA program can be thought of as a constrained version of such unconditional cash
transfers, even if the rates of return through labor market outcomes alone are half as much, this
still compares favorably with regards to other formal sector …nancial investment opportunities
available in Uganda in mid-2008 when the ELA program was initiated.43
42Similarly, Baird et al. [2012] report that the provision of unconditional cash transfers via lotteries, to girls aged
13-22 and enrolled in school at baseline in Malawi, signi…cantly reduced the prevalence of HIV and herpes simplex
virus 2 [HSV-2] after 18 months. These e¤ects were also supported by self-reported sexual behaviors. To gauge
the cost per treated girl, we note that monthly cash transfers valued at between $4 and $10 were provided to girls
along with monthly transfers of between $1 and $5 to their guardians.
43For example, the International Financial Statistics of the IMF state that the deposit rate in the formal sec-
tor in Uganda (i.e. the rate paid by commercial banks for savings deposits) was 10.7% in 2008, 9.75% in 2009
and 7.69% in 2010. An alternative investment would have been to buy a two-year Uganda Treasury bond auc-
tioned at the end of May 2008. It sold at a discount and yielded 14.45% according to the Bank of Uganda
(http://www.bou.or.ug/bou/collateral/tbond_forms/2008/May/tbond_28May2008.html).
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6 Conclusions
Developing countries face enormous challenges stemming from rapid population growth and a
rising proportion of young people entering the labor market. For women in developing countries,
these challenges are coupled with a lack of empowerment: they lag behind their contemporaries
in richer nations on many relevant dimensions of female empowerment but most strikingly so as
regards economic empowerment and control over the body. Yet e¤ectively facing each challenge
requires us to think jointly about economic and reproductive issues [Du‡o 2012]. A lack of future
labor market opportunities can reduce the incentives for young girls to invest in their human
capital leading to early marriage and childbearing, and potentially increasing their dependency
on older men. At the same time, teen pregnancy and early marriage are likely to have a decisive
impact on the ability of young girls to accumulate human capital and limit their future labor force
participation.
In this paper we evaluate an attempt to jump-start female economic and social empowerment
in a country with the world’s second youngest population: Uganda. We carefully measure key
dimensions of women’s empowerment at baseline and examine the impacts of a multifaceted pro-
gram that provides adolescent girls an opportunity to simultaneously relax constraints related to
two types of human capital: vocational skills to enable them to start small-scale income generating
activities, and life skills to enable them to make informed choices about sex, reproduction and mar-
riage. The ideas which underpin the program were developed in Bangladesh where the program
has achieved signi…cant scale. Our evidence suggests these ideas can be e¤ectively transported
(with modi…cation) from South Asia to a setting in Sub-Saharan Africa. Engaging in economic
activities and delaying childbearing and marriage is likely to have a major impact on the life
trajectories of adolescent girls. For example, such delays have been shown, in other contexts,
to improve marriage quality, increase decision-making within households and reduce exposure to
domestic violence [Goldin and Katz 2002, Jensen and Thornton 2003, Field and Ambrus 2008].
Alongside economic empowerment they are fundamental to improving women’s lives.
Africa has been a laggard relative to other developing regions in terms of how quickly it is
converging to the low fertility, late marriage and high career participation norms that characterize
women’s lives in developed nations. There is thus a case to be made for cost e¤ective programs
like this to help women in Africa accelerate convergence towards these norms. What our results
suggest is that such progress is possible. The impacts found over a four-year period suggest that
the poor life circumstances that adolescent girls …nd themselves in at baseline will not necessarily
be maintained by binding social norms.
The external validity of our results are currently being researched as ELA-style programs
have been piloted in multiple Sub-Saharan countries. The program o¤ers some promise to policy
makers, this being a low cost and scalable intervention that enables adolescent girls to improve
their life outcomes. As this research agenda expands, an obvious direction for future work is to
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understand the relative importance on empowerment of vocational skills, life skills, the provision
of a safe space and access to older mentors, as well as complementarities or substitutabilities
between these components. However, this will require more than just unbundling components
into treatment arms because at heart, female empowerment remains a multidimensional concept,
that requires multidimensional solutions. Understanding the dynamic process of empowerment at
scale will inevitably lead to challenges of feedback and general equilibrium e¤ects, that suggest a
key role remains for long term longitudinal and/or historic studies.
Another direction for future work is to study further the impacts such programs have on in-
teractions between men and adolescent girls. This would help crystallize whether gains occur
because adolescent girls are able to match with better quality men when their human capital
improves [Dupas 2011], whether it improves their bargaining power in existing relationships, say
because of a direct impact of earned income of women and their autonomy in relationships [An-
derson and Eswaran 2009], or whether men change attitudes towards women as the program raises
returns to women’s human capital.44 This last channel is an important mechanism that drove the
provision of women’s rights across countries over time [Doepke and Tertilt 2009, Doepke et al.
2012, Jayachandran 2015], and can feed back into a virtuous circle that further widens women’s
economic opportunities and drives forward economic development [Goldin and Katz 2002, Bailey
2006, Tertilt 2006, Doepke et al. 2012, Du‡o 2012, Jayachandran 2015].
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Table 1: Adolescent Girl Empowerment at Baseline
Sample: Adolescent Girls Surveyed at Baseline (N=5966)
Means, standard errors in parentheses, standard deviations in brackets
(1) Treatment (2) Control (3) Difference (4) NormalizedDifference
A. Characteristics
Age 16.3 16.4 -.063 (.150) -.015
[2.80] [2.96]
Currently enrolled in school .710 .720 -.010 (.027) -.016
Has child(ren) .105 .101 .003 (.017) .008
Married or cohabiting .094 .113 -.020 (.014) -.046
B. Economic Empowerment
Entrepreneurial ability [0-100 score] 69.5 71.9 -2.48 (1.64) -.071
[24.7] [24.9]
Self-employed .072 .061 .011 (.010) .032
Wage employed .055 .035 .020** (.009) .067
Never worry to get a good job in adulthood .425 .401 .024 (.026) .035
C. Control Over the Body
Had sex unwillingly in the past year .198 .144 .054** (.022) .102
Pregnancy knowledge [0-1 score] .738 .742 -.004 (.025) -.006
3.82 3.76 .055 (.076) .032
[1.24] [1.25]
If sexually active, always uses condom .511 .517 -.006 (.039) -.009
If sexually active, uses other contraceptives .153 .169 -.016 (.026) -.032
D. Beliefs and Aspirations
Gender empowerment [0-100 score] 28.5 31.3 -2.81 -.081
Suitable age at marriage for a woman 24.0 23.9 .115 .026
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is based on adolescent girls who are surveyed at baseline (N =
5966). The standard errors on the differences are estimated from running the corresponding least squares regression and allowing for the
errors to be clustered by community. The normalized difference is computed following Imbens and Wooldridge [2009]. In Panel B, the
entrepreneurial ability index is the cumulative and rescaled score aggregating the self-assessed ranks to the following activities (where 10
was the highest rank and 1 the lowest): "Run your own business", "Identify business opportunities to start up new business", "Obtain credit
to start up new business or expand existing business", "Save in order to invest in future business opportunities", "Make sure that your
employees get the work done properly", "Manage financial accounts", "Bargain to obtain cheap prices when you are buying anything for
business (inputs)", "Bargain to obtain high prices when you are selling anything for business (outputs)", "Protect your business assets from
harm by others", "Collecting the money someone owes you". In Panel C, the pregnancy knowledge index equals one if the respondent
correctly identifies the statement, "A woman cannot become pregnant at first intercourse or with occasional sexual relations" as true or
false. The HIV knowledge index is based on the number of statements correctly identified as true or false. The relevant statements are "A
person who has HIV is different from a person who is ill with AIDS", "During vaginal sex, it is easier for a woman to receive the HIV virus
than for a man", "Pulling out the penis before a man climaxes keeps a woman from getting HIV during sex", "A woman cannot get HIV if she
has sex during her period", "Taking a test for HIV one week after having sex will tell a person if she or he has HIV", and, "A Pregnant
woman with HIV can give the virus to her unborn baby." Variables indicating suitable ages were trimmed at 15 years or younger. In Panel D,
the gender empowerment index cumulates the number of times a respondent answers "Both/Same" to the following questions: "Who
should earn money for the family?", "Who should have a higher level of education in the family?", "Who should be responsible for washing,
cleaning and cooking?", "If there is no water pump or tap, who should fetch water?", "Who should be responsible for feeding and bathing
children?", "Who should help the children in their studies at home?" and "Who should be responsible for looking after the ill persons?" The
other possible answers given to the respondent were "Male" and "Female". The index is then rescaled such that 100 indicates that the
respondent answered that the female should (at least partly) be responsible for all the activities.
HIV knowledge [0-6 score]
OLS estimates
Standard errors clustered by community
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Treatment .023 .024 -.013 -.013 -.013 -.153 -.011 -.011 -.124
(.030) (.027) (.102) (.045) (.022) (.104) (.043) (.024) (.111)
Age -.0006 -.006 -.004
(.004) (.005) (.005)
-.025 -.033 -.023
(.032) (.031) (.034)
Married or Cohabiting .045 .019 .046
(.035) (.043) (.044)
Has Child(ren) .024 -.006 .006
(.040) (.055) (.060)
-.019 .027 .023
(.016) (.017) (.019)
.032 .044 .055
(.040) (.042) (.046)
Aspiration Index .014 .026 .021
(.017) (.018) (.019)
Treatment x Age .00006 .006 .005
(.005) (.005) (.006)
.059 .042 .041
(.041) (.041) (.044)
-.045 -.001 -.031
(.045) (.052) (.054)
Treatment x has Child(ren) .001 .054 .035
(.052) (.066) (.072)
.027 -.033 -.032
(.020) (.020) (.023)
-.036 -.024 -.035
(.051) (.053) (.058)
-.014 -.044* -.044*
(.019) (.023) (.024)
Mean of Dependent Variable:
Branch Dummies No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes
Observations 5966 5966 5661 5966 5966 5661 5966 5966 5661
F-statistic [p-value] .652/.712 1.55/.156 1.25/.279
Table 2: Attrition
Tracked Between Baseline
and Midline
Control Over the Body Index
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The dependent variable in Columns 1-3 is a dummy that is equal to one if the adolescent girl is
tracked between the baseline survey and the midline survey, and zero otherwise. The dependent variable in Columns 4-6 is a dummy that is equal to one if the
adolescent girl is tracked between the baseline and endline surveys (but is not necessarily observed at midline). The dependent variable in Columns 7-9 is a
dummy that is equal to one if the adolescent girl is tracked between baseline, midline and endline surveys. Standard errors are clustered by community. The
indices for economic empowerment, control over the body, and aspirations, each aggregates information over a range of relevant outcomes, where we first
convert each subcomponent into a z-score, average across subcomponents and then re-construct a z-score of the average. The economic empowerment index
has subcomponents based on a girl's entrepreneurial ability score, whether any IGA is engaged in, whether she is self-employed, wage employed, and her
monthly expenditures on goods. The control over the body index has subcomponents using information on whether the adolescent has children, is
married/cohabiting, had sex unwillingly in the last year, her pregnancy knowledge, her HIV knowledge, and if sexually active, whether she always uses condoms
or other contraceptives. The aspirations index has subcomponents related to the gender empowerment index, what she views as a suitable age at marriage for a
woman, suitable age at marriage for a man, her preferred number of children, what she views as the suitable age for a woman to have her first child, the preferred
age at which her daughters should marry, and her preferred age for her sons to marry. There are ten branch dummies controlled for in Columns 2, 3, 5, 6, 8 and
9. At the foot of Columns 3, 6 and 9 we report the joint F-statistic and corresponding p-value on the null of the joint significance of all interactions between
treatment and individual characteristics of adolescent girls.
Treatment x Currently Enrolled in School
Currently Enrolled in School
Tracked Between Baseline,
Midline and Endline
.588
Treatment x Control Over the Body Index
Treatment x Aspiration Index
Tracked Between Baseline
and Endline
.819 .647
Economic Empowerment Index
Treatment x Married or Cohabiting
Treatment x Economic Empowerment Index
Treatment Control Difference NormalizedDifference Treatment Control Difference
Normalized
Difference
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Have heard about club? .590 .400 .189*** .272 .795 .613 .182*** .287
(.036) (.042)
.207 .047 .159*** .349 .246 .083 .163*** .318
(.016) (.024)
Continued participation .629 .356
Attended club meetings at least 3 times a week .273 .421
Attended club meetings 1 or 2 times a week .494 .337
Received life skills training .846 .758
Received livelihood skills training .526 .602
Received life and livelihood skills training .507 .569
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Columns 1-4 relate to midline outcomes: the sample covers adolescent girls tracked from baseline to midline and where
information on their age is available (N = 4831). Columns 5-8 relate to endline outcomes: the sample covers those adolescent girls tracked from baseline to midline and endline and where
information on their age is available (N = 3474). The standard errors on the differences are estimated from running the corresponding least squares regression allowing for the errors to be
clustered by community. The normalized difference is computed following Imbens and Wooldridge [2009]. The indicators for having received life skills and/or livelihood skills are elicited from
respondents' declarations to having participated in the corresponding training sessions at least very few times. Training area examples mentioned for the life skill training include learning
about pregnancy or HIV. Training area examples mentioned for the livelihood training include training in hair-dressing, computer and poultry rearing. Continued participation is coded as one
if the girl reports still attending the ELA club on survey date.
Table 3: Participation in ELA Clubs
Means, standard errors in parentheses
Girls Tracked to Midline (N = 4831) Girls Tracked to Endline (N = 3474)
Conditional on ever having participated in an ELA club:
Have ever participated in club activities,
conditional on having heard about club?
Table 4: Economic Empowerment
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, standard deviations in brackets
Lee bounds estimated using panel inclusion at midline/endline as the selection indicator
71.8 4797 / 3455 5.63*** 1.80*
[24.7] (.982) (.951)
4.82*** 7.31*** .279 2.13**
(.931) (1.12) (.964) (.962)
2. Any IGA .102 4831 / 3474 .068*** .049**
[.302] (.016) (.020)
.049*** .076*** .044*** .068***
(.016) (.012) (.017) (.023)
3. Self-employed .063 4831 / 3474 .059*** .032*
[.243] (.012) (.017)
.039*** .065*** .030** .054**
(.015) (.010) (.014) (.023)
4. Wage employed .040 4831 / 3474 .009 .018
[.196] (.007) (.012)
-.017 .009 .015 .039*
(.015) (.007) (.011) (.023)
11916 4791 / 3411 4676*** 982
[18850] (950) (1814)
2365* 5519*** 270 5088**
(1347) (803) -1352 (2247)
.032 4831 / 3474 .269*** .131**
[1.03] (.043) (.056)
.203*** .319*** .090* .186***
(.048) (.037) (.046) (.062)
Adolescent Girl Controls and Branch Dummies Yes Yes
5. Expenditure on
goods in the last
month [UGX]
Economic
Empowerment Index
No No
.282***
(.058) (.066)
(1) Baseline,
Control
(2) Sample Size,
Midline/Endline (3) Midline (4) Endline
(.019)
.070***
(6) Endline(5) Midline
.050**
.123*
(.009)
(2155)(1357)
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are clustered by community. The control variables include the
adolescent girl's age and a series of indicators for branch areas. The entrepreneurial ability index is the cumulative and rescaled score aggregating
the self-assessed ranks to the following activities (where 10 was the highest rank and 1 the lowest): "Run your own business", "Identify business
opportunities to start up new business", "Obtain credit to start up new business or expand existing business", "Save in order to invest in future
business opportunities", "Make sure that your employees get the work done properly", "Manage financial accounts", "Bargain to obtain cheap prices
when you are buying anything for business (inputs)", "Bargain to obtain high prices when you are selling anything for business (outputs)", "Protect
your business assets from harm by others", "Collecting the money someone owes you". For the expenditure variable, the goods categories are
jewelry/ornaments, cosmetics/makeup, clothes, hairdressers, shoes/footwear, going to restaurants/bars/teashop/cafe, talk time for your mobile
phone and presents/gifts. The top 1% outliers of the expenditure variable are trimmed and the variable is deflated and expressed in terms of the
price level in January 2008 using the monthly consumer price index published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. The Economic Empowerment
Index is aggregates information over all outcomes, where we first convert each subcomponent into a z-score, average across subcomponents and
then re-construct a z-score of the average. The economic empowerment index has subcomponents based on a girl's entrepreneurial ability score,
whether any IGA is engaged in, whether she is self-employed, wage employed, and her monthly expenditures on goods. The Lee bounds in Column
5 are estimated considering girls included in the midline as the selected sample. The lower and upper bounds in Column 6 are estimated
considering girls included in the midline and endline as the selected sample.
1.29
(1.80)
.033*
(.019)
(.014)
.017
1. Entrepreneurial
ability [0-100 score]
5.76***
.008
(.013)
.061***
(2.17)
4972*** 1117
(.024)
Table 5: Control Over the Body
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, standard deviations in brackets
Lee bounds estimated using panel inclusion at midline/endline as the selection indicator
1. Has child(ren) .113 4806 / 3415 -.027*** -.038***
[.317] (.010) (.013)
-.054*** -.029*** -.043*** -.020
(.016) (.010) (.013) (.023)
2. Married or cohabiting .129 4713 / 3263 -.069*** -.080***
[.335] (.013) (.015)
-.094*** -.069*** -.086*** -.070***
(.017) (.011) (.016) (.023)
.174 1847 / 1655 -.061** -.053**
[.380] (.028) (.025)
-.102*** -.067*** -.033* -.023
(.033) (.019) (.018) (.038)
.737 4750 / 3386 .048** .025
[.441] (.021) (.016)
.051*** .077*** .009 .035**
(.015) (.018) (.023) (.016)
5. HIV knowledge [0-6 score] 3.79 4831 / 3474 .471*** .109**
[1.26] (.047) (.045)
.452*** .611*** .036 .160***
(.053) (.070) (.081) (.061)
.446 1781 / 1630 .130*** .035
[.498] (.038) (.039)
.192*** .198*** .081** .099***
(.027) (.031) (.032) (.034)
.203 1781 / 1630 .028 -.019
[.403] (.031) (.049)
.046** .053* -.048* -.030
(.020) (.032) (.029) (.036)
Control Over the Body Index -.018 4831 / 3474 .535*** .269***
[1.03] (.038) (.034)
.521*** .611*** .193*** .305***
(.033) (.041) (.064) (.047)
Adolescent Girl Controls and Branch Dummies Yes Yes
.115
(.034)
(.032)
-.082**
(.039)
.089**
-.031
(.078)
4. Pregnancy knowledge [0-1
score]
3. Had sex unwillingly in the
past year
(.026)
-.071***
(.017)
-.031*
(.022)
-.040*
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are clustered by community. The control variables include the
adolescent girl's age and a series of indicator variables for branch areas. The pregnancy knowledge index equals one if the respondent correctly
identifies the statement "A woman cannot become pregnant at first intercourse or with occasional sexual relations" as true or false. The HIV knowledge
index is based on the number of statements correctly identified as true or false. The relevant statements are "A person who has HIV is different from a
person who is ill with AIDS", "During vaginal sex, it is easier for a woman to receive the HIV virus than for a man", "Pulling out the penis before a man
climaxes keeps a woman from getting HIV during sex", "A woman cannot get HIV if she has sex during her period", "Taking a test for HIV one week
after having sex will tell a person if she or he has HIV," and "A Pregnant woman with HIV can give the virus to her unborn baby". The Control Over the
Body Index aggregates information over all outcomes, where we first convert each subcomponent into a z-score, average across subcomponents and
then re-construct a z-score of the average. The index has subcomponents on whether the adolescent has children, is married/cohabiting, had sex
unwillingly in the last year, her pregnancy knowledge, her HIV knowledge, and if sexually active, whether she always uses condoms or other
contraceptives. The Lee bounds in Column 5 are estimated considering girls included in the midline as the selected sample. The lower and upper
bounds in Column 6 are estimated considering girls included in the midline and endline as the selected sample.
6. If sexually active, always
uses condom
7. If sexually active, uses
other contraceptives
(.030)
.194***
(.079)
.507***
-.042
(.037)(.028)
No No
.540***
.047*
(.060)
.265***
(.052)
(1) Baseline,
Control
(2) Sample Size,
Midline/Endline (3) Midline (4) Endline
.058**
(.024)
-.071***
.029
(.027)
(5) Midline (6) Endline
(.018)
Table 6: Aspirations
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, standard deviations in brackets
Lee bounds estimated using panel inclusion at midline/endline as the selection indicator
32.9 4831 / 3474 2.86*** -2.25
[24.4] (.932) (1.59)
1.10 3.45*** -3.24*** -.969
(.996) (.789) (1.08) (1.53)
23.9 4790 / 3457 .770*** .231*
[3.08] (.116) (.132)
.679*** 1.01*** -.006 .320**
(.116) (.134) (.188) (.153)
28.0 4789 / 3453 .693*** .199
[3.74] (.125) (.149)
.546*** 1.01*** -.109 .363*
(.135) (.163) (.238) (.189)
4.11 4774 / 3416 -.279*** .013
[1.43] (.052) (.052)
-.394*** -.247*** -.053 .137
(.051) (.048) (.072) (.084)
23.5 4781 / 3445 .619*** .272*
[3.20] (.110) (.158)
.538*** .880*** .101 .431***
(.107) (.118) (.152) (.144)
24.8 4757 / 3380 .718*** .123
[2.64] (.118) (.116)
.605*** .928*** -.101 .184
(.109) (.119) (.156) (.136)
28.4 4761 / 3378 .120 .025
[3.13] (.113) (.116)
-.003 .431*** -.204 .185
(.126) (.156) (.184) (.195)
Aspirations Index -.015 4831 / 3474 .269*** .059
[.967] (.038) (.045)
.233*** .361*** -.014 .106*
(.038) (.043) (.060) (.060)
Adolescent Girl Controls and Branch Dummies Yes Yes No No
(.095)
.045
(.055)
.290***
.059
(.126)
.749***
(.311)
-.014
(.167)
.185
(.209)
(5) Midline (6) Endline
(.252)
.176
(.145)
.826***
(2.08)
-2.56
(1.26)
2.63**
(.213)
.277
(.168)
4. Preferred number of children
.681***
.028
(.089)
-.296***
(1) Baseline,
Control
(2) Sample Size,
Midline/Endline (3) Midline (4) Endline
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are clustered by community. The control variables include the adolescent
girl's age and a series of indicator variables for branch areas. The gender empowerment index is the sum of the answers to the following questions: "Who
should earn money for the family?", "Who should have a higher level of education in the family?", "Who should be responsible for washing, cleaning and
cooking?", "If there is no water pump or tap, who should fetch water?", "Who should be responsible for feeding and bathing children?", "Who should help
the children in their studies at home?" and "Who should be responsible for looking after the ill persons?" where answers are coded as one if the
respondent chooses "both" and zero otherwise. The other possible answers given to the respondent were "Male" and "Female". The index is then rescaled
such that 100 indicates that the respondent answered that the female should (at least partly) be responsible for all the activities. All variables indicating
ages are trimmed at 15 years or younger. The Aspirations Index aggregates information over all outcomes, where we first convert each subcomponent into
a z-score, average across subcomponents and then re-construct a z-score of the average. The index has subcomponents made up of the gender
empowerment index, what she views as a suitable age at marriage for a woman, her suitable age at marriage for a man, her preferred number of children,
what she views as the suitable age for a woman to have her first child, the preferred age at which her daughters should marry, and her preferred age for
her sons to marry. The Lee bounds in Column 5 are estimated considering girls included in the midline as the selected sample. The lower and upper
bounds in Column 6 are estimated considering girls included in the midline and endline as the selected sample.
7. Preferred age at which son(s)
get married
1. Gender empowerment index
[0-100 score]
2. Suitable age at marriage for a
woman
3. Suitable age at marriage for a
man
5. Suitable age for women to
have the first child
6. Preferred age at which
daughter(s) get married
(.366)
.139
(.198)
.747***
(.086)
Table 7: Spillovers, Non-Participation and Other Treatment Effects
A. Midline
(1) ITT (2) 2SLS (3) Participants (4) Non-Participants (5) ATE (6) ATT (7) ATU
Economic Empowerment Index .269*** 1.72*** .910*** .152*** 1.57*** .909** 1.91**
(.043) (.283) (.070) (.042) (.338) (.404) (.546)
Control Over the Body Index .535*** 3.41*** .939*** .436*** 2.32*** 3.45*** 1.63***
(.038) (.419) (.057) (.039) (.260) (.335) (.415)
Aspirations Index .269*** 1.72*** .395*** .240*** 1.05*** 1.91*** .555
(.038) (.298) (.396) (.039) (.323) (.405) (.530)
Adolescent Girl Controls and
Branch Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 4831 4831 2184 4086
B. Endline
(1) ITT (2) 2SLS (3) Participants (4) Non-Participants (5) ATE (6) ATT (7) ATU
Economic Empowerment Index .131** .836** .435*** .054*** .885* 1.17*** .767
(.056) (.340) (.077) (.058) (.492) (.398) (.776)
Control Over the Body Index .269*** 1.71*** .388*** .212*** .834* 2.19*** .276
(.034) (.307) (.042) (.035) (.454) (.372) (.716)
Aspirations Index .059 .377 .030 .061 -.149 .518 -.406
(.045) (.296) (.060) (.049) (.441) (.359) (.697)
Adolescent Girl Controls and
Branch Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 3474 3474 1646 2812
3984
2942
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are clustered by community in Columns 1 to 4. The control variables include the
adolescent girl's age and a series of indicators for branch areas. The indices for economic empowerment, control over the body, and aspirations, each aggregates
information over a range of relevant outcomes, where we first convert each subcomponent into a z-score, average across subcomponents and then re-construct a z-
score of the average. The economic empowerment index has subcomponents based on a girl's entrepreneurial ability score, whether any IGA is engaged in,
whether she is self-employed, wage employed, and her monthly expenditures on goods. The control over the body index has subcomponents using information on
whether the adolescent has children, is married/cohabiting, had sex unwillingly in the last year, her pregnancy knowledge, her HIV knowledge, and if sexually
active, whether she always uses condoms or other contraceptives. The aspirations index has subcomponents related to the gender empowerment index, what she
views as a suitable age at marriage for a woman, her suitable age at marriage for a man, her preferred number of children, what she views as the suitable age for a
woman to have her first child, the preferred age at which her daughters should marry, and her preferred age for her sons to marry. Column 2 shows 2SLS
estimates, where we instrument ELA participation with treatment assignment at the community level. The sample in Column 3 is based on ELA participants in
treated communities and non-participants in control communities. The sample in Column 4 is based on ELA non-participants in treated communities and non-
participants in Control communities. Columns 5 to 7 are derived from the marginal treatment effect estimates.
Standard errors in parentheses
(1) Midline (2) Endline
Economic Empowerment Index 1. Baseline ITT impact .269*** .131**
(.043) (.056)
.178*** .100*
(.041) (.053)
.091*** .031***
(.011) (.009)
4. Mediator: Participation in Life Skills Training .092*** .025***
(.015) (.009)
5. Mediator: Participation in Livelihood Skills Training -.001 .006
(.010) (.008)
Control Over the Body Index 1. Baseline ITT impact .535*** .269***
(.038) (.034)
2. Unrestricted Estimate .476*** .262***
(.038) (.035)
3. Total Mediated Effect .059*** .006
(.008) (.005)
4. Mediator: Participation in Life Skills Training .063*** .005
(.011) (.006)
5. Mediator: Participation in Livelihood Skills Training -.004 .002
(.006) (.007)
Aspirations Index 1. Baseline ITT impact .269*** .059
(.038) (.045)
2. Unrestricted Estimate .242*** .059
(.038) (.045)
3. Total Mediated Effect .026*** -.0004
(.008) (.004)
4. Mediator: Participation in Life Skills Training .033*** .008
(.011) (.007)
5. Mediator: Participation in Livelihood Skills Training -.006 -.009
(.009) (.008)
Number of Observations 4831 3474
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are clustered by community. The indices for economic empowerment,
control over the body, and aspirations, each aggregates information over a range of relevant outcomes, where we first convert each subcomponent
into a z-score, average across subcomponents and then re-construct a z-score of the average. The economic empowerment index has
subcomponents based on a girl's entrepreneurial ability score, whether any IGA is engaged in, whether she is self-employed, wage employed, and
her monthly expenditures on goods. The control over the body index has subcomponents using information on whether the adolescent has children,
is married/cohabiting, had sex unwillingly in the last year, her pregnancy knowledge, her HIV knowledge, and if sexually active, whether she always
uses condoms or other contraceptives. The aspirations index has subcomponents related to the gender empowerment index, what she views as a
suitable age at marriage for a woman, her suitable age at marriage for a man, her preferred number of children, what she views as the suitable age
for a woman to have her first child, the preferred age at which her daughters should marry, and her preferred age for her sons to marry. The table
shows the results from mediation analysis following Gelbach [2016]. In each panel, the first row shows the ITT impact, where the control variables
include the adolescent girl's age and a series of indicators for branch areas. In the second row we show the ITT impact once the mediators are
controlled for – these are participation in the life skill straining, and participation in the vocational skills training. Row 3 shows the total mediated effect
and rows 4 and 5 show the contribution of each mediator.
3. Total Mediated Effect (difference between ITT and
unrestricted effect)
Table 8: Mediation Analysis
2. Unrestricted Estimate (includes mediators as controls)
(1) Non-
Recurring
(2) Recurring
Monthly
(3) Year
One
(4) Year Two
Onwards
(1) Office Space & Equipment 10 Branch Offices 4000 4000
(2) Program Assistant Training 10 Assistants 2250 2250
(3) Training & Operational MaterialDevelopment 2 Manuals 4000 4000
(4) Program ManagementCompensation 2 Coordinators 780 9360 9360
(5) Program Assistant Compensation 10 Assistants 1690 20280 20280
(6) Adolescent Leader Compensation 100 Adolescent Leaders 1200 14400 14400
(7) Adolescent Leader Training 100 Adolescent Leaders 22500 22500
(8) Adolescent Leader Training (forReplacements) 20 Adolescent Leaders 4500 4500
(9) Adolescent Leader Refreshers 100 Adolescent Leaders 400 4800 4800
(10) Club Rent 100 Clubs 1000 12000 12000
(11) Club Materials 100 Clubs 42000 42000
(12) Club Materials (Replenishment) 100 Clubs 16800 16800
(13) Branch Office Overhead 10 Branch Offices 800 9600 9600
(14) Country Office Overhead 1 Country Office 4000 48000 48000
(15) Financial Literacy Courses 2500 Members 12500 12500 12500
(16) Livelihood Training (Year 1) 2000 Members 100000 100000
(17) Livelihood Training Inputs (Year 1) 2000 Members 60000 60000
(18) Livelihood Training (Year 2) 1000 Members 50000 50000
(19) Livelihood Training Inputs (Year 2) 1000 Members 30000 30000
C. Total
Costs (20) 365690 232240
(21) Fixed Costs 14.9 10.7
(22) Variable Costs 13.3 7.12
(23) Total Costs 28.1 17.9
E. Yearly
Benefits (24) 50
Table 9: Cost Effectiveness, in 2008 US$
B. Variable
Costs
ELA Program Costs for the 100 studied Communities
Notes: The exchange rate used to convert monetary values is based on January 2008 at which point $1 was worth approximately UGX1,700. The yearly costs
shown in Columns 3 and 4 are obtained by multiplying column 2 times 12 (months) and adding Column 1 for all fixed and variable cost categories applicable to
the respective year of operation. The yearly total cost of the ELA Program stated in row 20 is the summation of all individual cost items applicable to the
respective year. The yearly benefits shown in row 24 are based on the ITT impact estimates on endline earnings.
ITT Impact of ELA on Individual Annual Earnings
Assuming 130 potential girl
attendees per club
A. Fixed
Costs
D. Yearly
Per Unit
Average
Costs
Table A1: Balance in Baseline and Estimation Samples
Means, standard errors in parentheses, standard deviations in brackets
(1) Treatment (2) Control (3) Difference (4) NormalizedDifference (5) Difference
(6) Normalized
Difference
A. Characteristics
Age 16.3 16.4 -.063 (.150) -.015 -.014 (.162) -.004
[2.80] [2.96]
Currently enrolled in school .710 .720 -.010 (.027) -.016 .004 (.031) .006
If dropped out, plan to start/go back to school .524 .537 -.014 (.035) -.019 -.048 (.044) -.068
Has child(ren) .105 .101 .003 (.017) .008 .0006 (.022) .001
Married or cohabiting .094 .113 -.020 (.014) -.046 -.027 (.019) -.061
B. Economic Empowerment
Entrepreneurial ability [0-100 score] 69.5 71.9 -2.48 (1.64) -.071 -2.17 (1.97) -.063
[24.7] [24.9]
Self-employed .072 .061 .011 (.010) .032 -.007 (.009) -.022
Wage employed .055 .035 .020** (.009) .067 .018 (.011) .060
Never worry to get a good job in adulthood .425 .401 .024 (.026) .035 .007 (.031) .010
Expenditure on goods in the last month [UGX] 12519 11249 1269 (1020) .048 429 (1113) .016
[19508] [17924]
C. Control Over the Body
Had sex unwillingly in the past year .198 .144 .054** (.022) .102 .023 (.029) .042
Pregnancy knowledge [0-1 score] .738 .742 -.004 (.025) -.006 -.008 (.030) -.013
HIV knowledge [0-6 score] 3.82 3.76 .055 (.076) .032 .050 (.091) .028
[1.24] [1.25]
If sexually active, always uses condom .511 .517 -.006 (.039) -.009 -.023 (.051) -.033
If sexually active, uses other contraceptives .153 .169 -.016 (.026) -.032 -.016 (.045) -.029
D. Beliefs and Aspirations
Gender empowerment [0-100 score] 28.5 31.3 -2.81 (2.02) -.081 -4.18** (2.00) -.121
[24.2] [24.9]
Suitable age at marriage for a woman 24.0 23.9 .115 (.201) .026 .035 (.217) .008
[3.14] [3.17]
Preferred number of children 4.22 4.10 .120 (.101) .057 .076 (.106) .036
[1.55] [1.43]
Suitable age for women to have the first child 23.9 23.8 .165 (.251) .036 .204 (.257) .045
[3.20] [3.25]
Preferred age at which daughter(s) get married 25.0 24.8 .192 (.163) .048 .138 (.157) .035
[2.81] [2.84]
Preferred age at which son(s) get married 28.5 28.3 .192 (.165) .042 .090 (.163) .020
[3.23] [3.32]
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample in Columns 1 to 4 is based on adolescent girls who are surveyed at baseline (N = 5966). The sample in
Columns 5 and 6 is based on adolescent girls surveyed at baseline, midline and endline (and where age information is available) (N=3474). The standard errors on the differences are
estimated from running the corresponding least squares regression and allowing for the errors to be clustered by community. The normalized difference is computed following Imbens
and Wooldridge [2009]. In Panel B, the entrepreneurial ability index is the cumulative and rescaled score aggregating the self-assessed ranks to the following activities (where 10 was
the highest rank and 1 the lowest): "Run your own business", "Identify business opportunities to start up new business", "Obtain credit to start up new business or expand existing
business", "Save in order to invest in future business opportunities", "Make sure that your employees get the work done properly", "Manage financial accounts", "Bargain to obtain
cheap prices when you are buying anything for business (inputs)", "Bargain to obtain high prices when you are selling anything for business (outputs)", "Protect your business assets
from harm by others", "Collecting the money someone owes you". In Panel C, the pregnancy knowledge index equals one if the respondent correctly identifies the statement, "A
woman cannot become pregnant at first intercourse or with occasional sexual relations" as true or false. The HIV knowledge index is based on the number of statements correctly
identified as true or false. The relevant statements are "A person who has HIV is different from a person who is ill with AIDS", "During vaginal sex, it is easier for a woman to receive
the HIV virus than for a man", "Pulling out the penis before a man climaxes keeps a woman from getting HIV during sex", "A woman cannot get HIV if she has sex during her period",
"Taking a test for HIV one week after having sex will tell a person if she or he has HIV", and, "A Pregnant woman with HIV can give the virus to her unborn baby." Variables indicating
suitable ages were trimmed at 15 years or younger. In Panel D, the gender empowerment index cumulates the number of times a respondent answers "Both/Same" to the following
questions: "Who should earn money for the family?", "Who should have a higher level of education in the family?", "Who should be responsible for washing, cleaning and cooking?", "If
there is no water pump or tap, who should fetch water?", "Who should be responsible for feeding and bathing children?", "Who should help the children in their studies at home?" and
"Who should be responsible for looking after the ill persons?" The other possible answers given to the respondent were "Male" and "Female". The index is then rescaled such that 100
indicates that the respondent answered that the female should (at least partly) be responsible for all the activities.
Baseline Sample Estimation Sample
(N=5966) (N=3474)
Table A2: Participants and Non-participants
Sample: Adolescent Girls Tracked to Midline (N = 4888)
Means, standard errors in parentheses, standard deviations in brackets
(1) Participants (2) NonParticipants (3) Difference
(4) Normalized
Difference
16.3 16.4 -.134 -.033
[2.85] [2.86] (.129)
Currently enrolled in school .715 .712 .003 .005
[.452] [.453] (.023)
Gender empowerment index [0-100 score] 28.0 29.7 -1.71 -.050
[23.4] [24.5] (1.42)
Entrepreneurial ability [0-100 score] 68.9 70.5 -1.59 -.046
[24.1] [24.8] (1.22)
Self-employed .068 .066 .002 .004
[.252] [.249] (.010)
Wage-employed .051 .050 .0002 .0008
[.219] [.219] (.008)
Satisfaction with earnings/income [0-6 score] 1.15 1.25 -.102 -.042
[1.68] [1.77] (.092)
Never worry to get a good job in adulthood .429 .409 .020 .029
[.495] [.492] (.021)
Has child(ren) .090 .107 -.017 -.040
[.287] [.310] (.013)
Married or cohabiting .084 .107 -.022* -.054
[.278] [.309] (.012)
Had sex unwillingly in the past year .167 .186 -.019 -.036
[.373] [.389] (.026)
Pregnancy knowledge [0-1 score] .762 .738 .024 .039
[.426] [.440] (.019)
HIV knowledge [0-6 score] 3.83 3.81 .023 .013
[1.30] [1.23] (.064)
If sexually active, always uses condom .556 .507 .049 .070
[.498] [.500] (.034)
Economic empowerment index .028 .054 -.026 -.017
[1.06] [1.09] (.041)
Control over body index .025 -.053 .078* .056
[.959] [.994] (.045)
Aspirations index .036 .018 .018 .013
[1.01] [.996] (.048)
Number of Observations 752 4136
Age
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The sample is based on adolescent girls who are surveyed at baseline and midline (N = 4888). The
standard errors on the differences are estimated from running the corresponding least squares regression and allowing for the errors to be clustered by community. The
normalized difference is computed following Imbens and Wooldridge [2009]. The entrepreneurial ability index is the cumulative and rescaled score aggregating the self-
assessed ranks to the following activities (where 10 was the highest rank and 1 the lowest): "Run your own business", "Identify business opportunities to start up new
business", "Obtain credit to start up new business or expand existing business", "Save in order to invest in future business opportunities", "Make sure that your employees
get the work done properly", "Manage financial accounts", "Bargain to obtain cheap prices when you are buying anything for business (inputs)", "Bargain to obtain high
prices when you are selling anything for business (outputs)", "Protect your business assets from harm by others", "Collecting the money someone owes you". The
pregnancy knowledge index equals one if the respondent correctly identifies the statement, "A woman cannot become pregnant at first intercourse or with occasional
sexual relations" as true or false. The HIV knowledge index is based on the number of statements correctly identified as true or false. The relevant statements are "A
person who has HIV is different from a person who is ill with AIDS", "During vaginal sex, it is easier for a woman to receive the HIV virus than for a man", "Pulling out the
penis before a man climaxes keeps a woman from getting HIV during sex", "A woman cannot get HIV if she has sex during her period", "Taking a test for HIV one week
after having sex will tell a person if she or he has HIV", and, "A Pregnant woman with HIV can give the virus to her unborn baby." Variables indicating suitable ages were
trimmed at 15 years or younger. The gender empowerment index cumulates the number of times a respondent answers "Both/Same" to the following questions: "Who
should earn money for the family?", "Who should have a higher level of education in the family?", "Who should be responsible for washing, cleaning and cooking?", "If there
is no water pump or tap, who should fetch water?", "Who should be responsible for feeding and bathing children?", "Who should help the children in their studies at home?"
and "Who should be responsible for looking after the ill persons?" The other possible answers given to the respondent were "Male" and "Female". The index is then
rescaled such that 100 indicates that the respondent answered that the female should (at least partly) be responsible for all the activities. The indices for economic
empowerment, control over the body, and aspirations, each aggregates information over a range of relevant outcomes, where we first convert each subcomponent into a z-
score, average across subcomponents and then re-construct a z-score of the average. The economic empowerment index has subcomponents based on a girl's
entrepreneurial ability score, whether any IGA is engaged in, whether she is self-employed, wage employed, and her monthly expenditures on goods. The control over the
body index has subcomponents using information on whether the adolescent has children, is married/cohabiting, had sex unwillingly in the last year, her pregnancy
knowledge, her HIV knowledge, and if sexually active, whether she always uses condoms or other contraceptives. The aspirations index has subcomponents related to the
gender empowerment index, what she views as a suitable age at marriage for a woman, her suitable age at marriage for a man, her preferred number of children, what she
views as the suitable age for a woman to have her first child, the preferred age at which her daughters should marry, and her preferred age for her sons to marry.
Table A3: Earnings and Education
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, standard deviations in brackets
Lee bounds estimated using panel inclusion at midline/endline as the selection indicator
A. Earnings
Annual Earnings [UGX] 27,443 4824 / 3466 5,189 84,732**
[139,968] (17,498) (41,793)
-46438*** 11605 77138** 202552***
(15822) (13813) (38356) (69032)
B. Education Related Outcomes
Currently enrolled in school .685 4831 / 3475 -.018 .001
[.465] (.017) (.020)
-.022 .004 -.013 .011
(.015) (.017) (.022) (.020)
61.1 3243 / 1972 1.59* 1.69
[20.3] (.892) (1.18)
1.31 4.16*** -.229 2.69**
(.918) (1.17) (1.87) (1.29)
.573 1537 / 1393 .076** .044
[.496] (.037) (.043)
.071** .139*** -.023 .011
(.033) (.035) (.035) (.038)
Adolescent Girl Controls and Branch Dummies Yes Yes
(6) Endline(1) Baseline,Control
(2) Sample Size,
Midline/Endline (3) Midline (4) Endline (5) Midline
-.013 .0010
(.025) (.027)
9090 83429
(19284) (58519)
If enrolled, hours spent on going to and
attending school, homework and study
per week
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are clustered by community. The control variables include the adolescent girl's age and a series
of indicators for branch areas. The top 1% outliers of the annual earnings variable are trimmed and the variable is deflated and expressed in terms of the price level in January
2008 using the monthly consumer price index published by the Uganda Bureau of Statistics. The Lee bounds in Column 5 are estimated considering girls included in the midline
as the selected sample. The lower and upper bounds in Column 6 are estimated considering girls included in the midline and endline as the selected sample.
If dropped out, plan to start/go back to
school
.102*** -.008
(.035) (.043)
No No
(1.24) (1.61)
2.36* 1.63
Table A4: Pooled ANCOVA Specification
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses
Economic Empowerment Index 6948 .196*** .140**
(.052) (.053)
Control Over the Body Index 6948 .437*** .269***
(.043) (.043)
Aspirations Index 6948 .254*** .049
(.054) (.060)
Adolescent Girl Controls and Branch Dummies Yes Yes
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are clustered by community. A pooled
specification is used, exploiting data from baseline, midline and endline. The control variables include the adolescent
girl's age and a series of indicators for branch areas. The indices for economic empowerment, control over the body,
and aspirations, each aggregates information over a range of relevant outcomes, where we first convert each
subcomponent into a z-score, average across subcomponents and then re-construct a z-score of the average. The
economic empowerment index has subcomponents based on a girl's entrepreneurial ability score, whether any IGA is
engaged in, whether she is self-employed, wage employed, and her monthly expenditures on goods. The control over
the body index has subcomponents using information on whether the adolescent has children, is married/cohabiting, had
sex unwillingly in the last year, her pregnancy knowledge, her HIV knowledge, and if sexually active, whether she always
uses condoms or other contraceptives. The aspirations index has subcomponents related to the gender empowerment
index, what she views as a suitable age at marriage for a woman, her suitable age at marriage for a man, her preferred
number of children, what she views as the suitable age for a woman to have her first child, the preferred age at which
her daughters should marry, and her preferred age for her sons to marry.
(1) Sample Size (2) Midline (3) Endline
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values
Above
Median
Below
Median
Above
Median
Below
Median
A. Indices
Economic Empowerment Index .214*** .329*** .085 .186** .291*** .249*** .090 .169*** .257*** .285*** .195*** .084
(.044) (.074) (.076) (.081) (.056) (.055) (.065) (.064) (.047) (.057) (.052) (.079)
Control Over the Body Index .526*** .534*** .318*** .211*** .516*** .539*** .331*** .214*** .553*** .509*** .139*** .355***
(.053) (.054) (.048) (.049) (.045) (.046) (.050) (.041) (.042) (.051) (.043) (.048)
Aspirations Index .286*** .251*** .123** -.013 .217*** .304*** .046 .069 .238*** .296*** .016 .087
(.060) (.046) (.061) (.065) (.048) (.051) (.053) (.057) (.058) (.045) (.061) (.054)
B. Education Related Outcomes
Currently enrolled in school -.029 -.010 .014 -.013 -0.025 -.011 .00009 .003 -.023 -.018 -.030 .026
(.022) (.027) (.026) (.030) (.021) (.023) (.028) (.025) (.017) (.024) (.025) (.025)
2.16 .969 .052 3.55* 1.85 1.25 2.70 .613 1.39 1.78 -.037 5.03**
(1.44) (1.02) (1.31) (1.97) (1.30) (.942) (1.77) (1.35) (.957) (1.57) (1.16) (2.33)
.036 .139** .068 .009 .040 .100** .027 .055 .292* .062 .327 .033
(.050) (.053) (.060) (.048) (.068) (.041) (.073) (.046) (.165) (.038) (.221) (.044)
Adolescent Girl Controls and
Branch Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Younger
Than 16
Older
Than 16
HH Asset Value
If dropped out, plan to start/go
back to school
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are clustered by community. The control variables include the adolescent girl's age and a series of indicators for branch areas. The
indices for economic empowerment, control over the body, and aspirations, each aggregates information over a range of relevant outcomes, where we first convert each subcomponent into a z-score, average
across subcomponents and then re-construct a z-score of the average. The economic empowerment index has subcomponents based on a girl's entrepreneurial ability score, whether any IGA is engaged in,
whether she is self-employed, wage employed, and her monthly expenditures on goods. The control over the body index has subcomponents using information on whether the adolescent has children, is
married/cohabiting, had sex unwillingly in the last year, her pregnancy knowledge, her HIV knowledge, and if sexually active, whether she always uses condoms or other contraceptives. The aspirations index has
subcomponents related to the gender empowerment index, what she views as a suitable age at marriage for a woman, her suitable age at marriage for a man, her preferred number of children, what she views
as the suitable age for a woman to have her first child, the preferred age at which her daughters should marry, and her preferred age for her sons to marry.
Rural Urban Rural Urban
If enrolled, hours spent on going
to and attending school,
homework and study per week
Younger
Than 16
Older
Than 16
Endline
Table A5: Impact Heterogeneity
Midline Endline Midline Endline Midline
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, p-values
Below
Median
Above
Median
Below
Median
Above
Median
A. Indices
Economic Empowerment Index .268*** .280*** .152** .101 .267*** .268*** .086 .183***
(.055) (.051) (.059) (.071) (.049) (.056) (.064) (.065)
Control Over the Body Index .546*** .518*** .248*** .271*** .493*** .572*** .287*** .237***
(.049) (.046) (.053) (.047) (.050) (.050) (.045) (.049)
Aspirations Index .282*** .257*** .072 .060 .267*** .258*** .084 .036
(.053) (.048) (.050) (.058) (.045) (.047) (.052) (.060)
B. Education Related Outcomes
Currently enrolled in school -.018 -.015 -.004 .011 -.006 -.026 -.004 .017
(.022) (.022) (.025) (.025) (.022) (.023) (.024) (.026)
1.29 1.79 1.18 1.88 1.46 1.25 .899 2.83*
(1.22) (1.18) (1.40) (1.71) (1.10) (1.16) (1.33) (1.64)
.130** -.012 .059 .029 .059 .114** .055 .055
(.050) (.055) (.052) (.062) (.048) (.055) (.056) (.072)
Adolescent Girl Controls and
Branch Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Table A6: Parental Beliefs
If enrolled, hours spent on going
to and attending school,
homework and study per week
If dropped out, plan to start/go
back to school
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are clustered by community. The control variables include the adolescent girl's age and a series of indicators
for branch areas. The indices for economic empowerment, control over the body, and aspirations, each aggregates information over a range of relevant outcomes, where we first convert
each subcomponent into a z-score, average across subcomponents and then re-construct a z-score of the average. The economic empowerment index has subcomponents based on a
girl's entrepreneurial ability score, whether any IGA is engaged in, whether she is self-employed, wage employed, and her monthly expenditures on goods. The control over the body index
has subcomponents using information on whether the adolescent has children, is married/cohabiting, had sex unwillingly in the last year, her pregnancy knowledge, her HIV knowledge, and
if sexually active, whether she always uses condoms or other contraceptives. The aspirations index has subcomponents related to the gender empowerment index, what she views as a
suitable age at marriage for a woman, her suitable age at marriage for a man, her preferred number of children, what she views as the suitable age for a woman to have her first child, the
preferred age at which her daughters should marry, and her preferred age for her sons to marry.
Midline Endline Midline Endline
Parent's
Preference for
Man Being
Income Earner
Parent's
Preference for
Woman or Both
Being Income
Earner(s)
Parent's
Preference for
Man Being
Income Earner
Parent's
Preference for
Woman or Both
Being Income
Earner(s)
Parent's Preferred Age At Marriage
for a Woman
Table A7: Social Desirability Bias
Coefficients, standard errors in parentheses, standard deviations in brackets
Midline Endline Midline Endline Midline Endline
Treatment .291* .395** .507*** .297* .164 -.020
(.149) (.174) (.160) (.169) (.172) (.185)
Social Desirability Score .017 .015 .003 -.007 -.012 -.031*
(.011) (.015) (.015) (.016) (.015) (.017)
Treatment * Social Desirability Score -.003 -.029 .003 -.004 .012 .009
(.016) (.020) (.018) .019 (.019) (.020)
Adolescent Girl Controls and Branch
Dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. Standard errors are clustered by community. The control variables include the adolescent
girl's age and a series of indicators for branch areas. The indices for economic empowerment, control over the body, and aspirations, each aggregates
information over a range of relevant outcomes, where we first convert each subcomponent into a z-score, average across subcomponents and then re-
construct a z-score of the average. The economic empowerment index has subcomponents based on a girl's entrepreneurial ability score, whether any
IGA is engaged in, whether she is self-employed, wage employed, and her monthly expenditures on goods. The control over the body index has
subcomponents using information on whether the adolescent has children, is married/cohabiting, had sex unwillingly in the last year, her pregnancy
knowledge, her HIV knowledge, and if sexually active, whether she always uses condoms or other contraceptives. The aspirations index has
subcomponents related to the gender empowerment index, what she views as a suitable age at marriage for a woman, her suitable age at marriage for
a man, her preferred number of children, what she views as the suitable age for a woman to have her first child, the preferred age at which her
daughters should marry, and her preferred age for her sons to marry. The social desirability score is based on the individual scores respondents
assigned to the following statement "I want to be a respectful person in my village." where respondents were asked whether this statement is true on a
scale of 1-10 and where 1 indicated “not at all” and 10 indicated “a lot”.
(1) Economic
Empowerment Index
(2) Control Over the
Body Index (3) Aspirations Index
Probit Estimates, Marginal Effects Shown
Dependent Variable: Participation in ELA
Midline Endline Midline Endline Midline Endline
Distance to Nearest ELA Club (km) -.056 -.097 -.052 -.072 -.054 -.016
(.051) (.068) (.052) (.068) (.052) (.056)
.013 .017 .011 .010 .012 .002
(.016) (.022) (.016) (.022) (.016) (.017)
.140*** .142*** .141*** .151*** .141*** .131***
(.018) (.026) (.018) (.025) (.018) .021
-.104* -.070 -.116** -.093 -.108* -.119*
(.058) (.078) (.058) (.078) (.058) (.063)
.052** .053* .059*** .059** .053** .055**
(.021) (.029) (.021) (.029) (.021) (.023)
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
3,984 2,943 3,985 2,942 3,985 2,942
.184 (.084) .230 (.135) .185 (.087) .231 (.136) .183 (.083) .231 (.139)
.122 (.081) .167 (.098) .122 (.081) .166 (.098) .122 (.081) .166 (.098)Mean (sd) of predicted propensity for non-participants
Notes: *** denotes significance at 1%, ** at 5%, and * at 10%. The dependent variable is whether the adolescent girl reports participating in the ELA club, at midline and at endline. Marginal effects
from probit regressions are shown. The indices for economic empowerment, control over the body, and aspirations, each aggregates information over a range of relevant outcomes, where we first
convert each subcomponent into a z-score, average across subcomponents and then re-construct a z-score of the average. The economic empowerment index has subcomponents based on a
girl's entrepreneurial ability score, whether any IGA is engaged in, whether she is self-employed, wage employed, and her monthly expenditures on goods. The control over the body index has
subcomponents using information on whether the adolescent has children, is married/cohabiting, had sex unwillingly in the last year, her pregnancy knowledge, her HIV knowledge, and if sexually
active, whether she always uses condoms or other contraceptives. The aspirations index has subcomponents related to the gender empowerment index, what she views as a suitable age at
marriage for a woman, her suitable age at marriage for a man, her preferred number of children, what she views as the suitable age for a woman to have her first child, the preferred age at which
her daughters should marry, and her preferred age for her sons to marry. In each specification, we control for the baseline value of the empowerment index, as well as the adolescent girl's age and
a series of indicators for branch areas. The distance to the nearest club is defined for all girls in treatment and control communities. The samples are smaller than the usual midline and endline
samples because of missing distance values. At the foot of each Column we report statistics on the implied propensities. We trim lower and upper 1% of values of the common support for the MTE
estimation.
Distance * Treatment
Squared Distance * Treatment
Branch Dummies
Controls
Observations
Mean (sd) of predicted propensity for participants
Treatment
Table A8: First Stage Estimates
(1) Economic
Empowerment Index
(2) Control Over the Body
Index (3) Aspirations Index
Squared Distance to Nearest ELA Club
Figure 1B: Age-Specific Fertility Rate, 1995-2010
Notes: The data stems from the 2010 UN World Population Prospects data base. The fertility rate
is measured by the number of births per 1,000 women. More developed regions comprise Europe,
Northern America, Australia/New Zealand and Japan.
Figure 1A: Female Population by Age, 2010
Notes: The data stems from the 2010 UN World Population Prospects data base. More developed
regions comprise Europe, Northern America, Australia/New Zealand and Japan.
Control Over the
Body Aspirations
1
1
Notes: The indices for economic empowerment, control over the body, and aspirations, each aggregates information over a range of relevant outcomes, where we first convert each subcomponent into a z-score, average across subcomponents and
then re-construct a z-score of the average. The economic empowerment index has subcomponents based on a girl's entrepreneurial ability score, whether any IGA is engaged in, whether she is self-employed, wage employed, and her monthly
expenditures on goods. The control over the body index has subcomponents using information on whether the adolescent has children, is married/cohabiting, had sex unwillingly in the last year, her pregnancy knowledge, her HIV knowledge, and if
sexually active, whether she always uses condoms or other contraceptives. The aspirations index has subcomponents related to the gender empowerment index, what she views as a suitable age at marriage for a woman, her suitable age at
marriage for a man, her preferred number of children, what she views as the suitable age for a woman to have her first child, the preferred age at which her daughters should marry, and her preferred age for her sons to marry. Each Panel shows the
histogram and a kernel density estimate for each index, using the sample of all girls at baseline (N=5966).
Sample: Adolescent Girls Surveyed at Baseline (N=5966)
Figure 2: Adolescent Girls Empowerment at Baseline
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Figure 3A: The ITT Impact at Midline of the ELA Program on
Entrepreneurship Measures
Notes: The control variables include the adolescent girl's age and a series of indicator variables for
branch areas. The adolescents were asked to rank their ability on how well they can do the
following activities on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 means they cannot do this activity and 10 is they
definitely can (clockwise, beginning with the spoke on top): "Run your own business", "Identify
business opportunities to start up new business", "Obtain credit to start up new business or expand
existing business", "Save in order to invest in future business opportunities", "Make sure that your
employees get the work done properly", "Manage financial accounts", "Bargain to obtain cheap
prices when you are buying anything for business (inputs)", "Bargain to obtain high prices when you
are selling anything for business (outputs)", "Protect your business assets from harm by others",
and "Collecting the money someone owes you".
Figure 3B: The ITT Impact at Endline of the ELA Program on
Entrepreneurship Measures
Notes: The control variables include the adolescent girl's age and a series of indicator variables for
branch areas. The adolescents were asked to rank their ability on how well they can do the
following activities on a scale of 1 to 10, 1 means they cannot do this activity and 10 is they
definitely can (clockwise, beginning with the spoke on top): "Run your own business", "Identify
business opportunities to start up new business", "Obtain credit to start up new business or expand
existing business", "Save in order to invest in future business opportunities", "Make sure that your
employees get the work done properly", "Manage financial accounts", "Bargain to obtain cheap
prices when you are buying anything for business (inputs)", "Bargain to obtain high prices when you
are selling anything for business (outputs)", "Protect your business assets from harm by others",
and "Collecting the money someone owes you".
C. Aspirations Index
Midline Endline
Notes: The indices for economic empowerment, control over the body, and aspirations, each aggregates information over a range of relevant outcomes, where we first convert each subcomponent into a z-score, average across subcomponents and then re-construct a z-score of the average. The
economic empowerment index has subcomponents based on a girl's entrepreneurial ability score, whether any IGA is engaged in, whether she is self-employed, wage employed, and her monthly expenditures on goods. The control over the body index has subcomponents using information on whether
the adolescent has children, is married/cohabiting, had sex unwillingly in the last year, her pregnancy knowledge, her HIV knowledge, and if sexually active, whether she always uses condoms or other contraceptives. The aspirations index has subcomponents related to the gender empowerment index,
what she views as a suitable age at marriage for a woman, her suitable age at marriage for a man, her preferred number of children, what she views as the suitable age for a woman to have her first child, the preferred age at which her daughters should marry, and her preferred age for her sons to
marry. Each Panel shows the marginal treatment effects for the index, either at midline or endline, along with a 95% confidence interval. This is based on a parametric Normal assumption. In each Panel, the average treatment effect is also shown in the dashed horizontal line.
Figure 4: Marginal Treatment Effects
A. Economic Empowerment Index
Midline Endline
B. Control Over the Body Index
Midline Endline
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C. Aspirations Index
Midline Endline
Notes: Each panel shows the propensity score from the first stage, for participants and non-participants at midline and endline. We trim lower and upper 1% of values of the common support for the MTE estimation, as shown in the vertical dashed lines. The indices for economic empowerment,
control over the body, and aspirations, each aggregates information over a range of relevant outcomes, where we first convert each subcomponent into a z-score, average across subcomponents and then re-construct a z-score of the average. The economic empowerment index has
subcomponents based on a girl's entrepreneurial ability score, whether any IGA is engaged in, whether she is self-employed, wage employed, and her monthly expenditures on goods. The control over the body index has subcomponents using information on whether the adolescent has children,
is married/cohabiting, had sex unwillingly in the last year, her pregnancy knowledge, her HIV knowledge, and if sexually active, whether she always uses condoms or other contraceptives. The aspirations index has subcomponents related to the gender empowerment index, what she views as a
suitable age at marriage for a woman, her suitable age at marriage for a man, her preferred number of children, what she views as the suitable age for a woman to have her first child, the preferred age at which her daughters should marry, and her preferred age for her sons to marry.
Figure A2: Propensity Scores
A. Economic Empowerment Index
Midline Endline
B. Control Over the Body Index
Midline Endline
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